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The current financial crisis has lessons for three areas of credit portfolio man-
agement. First, the credit crisis has highlighted the need to manage the funding
risk of a bank. Second, it has highlighted the need to manage the underwriting
risk of debt syndications. Finally, it has suggested the need to understand the
drivers of relationship banking. The first paper in this dissertation develops an
empirically grounded model to manage the funding risk of a bank. The sec-
ond paper develops an option pricing framework to manage the underwriting
risk in debt syndications. The last paper in this dissertation uses a proprietary
dataset to study the empirical determinants of relationship banking benefits.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The current financial crisis was primarily a credit crisis. Banks involved in
originating or securitizing sub-prime loans suffered losses when the real estate
bubble burst, which raised concerns about the viability of those banks. As a re-
sult, banks with significant reliance on wholesale funding had problems rolling
over their existing short-term funding. Consequently, many banks perished or
were taken over or came close to bankruptcy. Besides losing money on sub-
prime investments, banks also lost significant amount of money on leveraged
loan commitments. Banks were sitting on a huge portfolio of leveraged loan
underwritings at the time of Lehman bankruptcy, and couldn’t syndicate these
commitments due to market meltdown. Consequently, the banks lost billions of
dollars on these underwriting deals. The credit crisis also made capital scarce
for the banks, which in turn made banks more cautious towards lending. The
use of bank balance sheet was rationed and banks opened their tight fist only
for customers with strong banking relationships.
To summarize, the current financial crisis has lessons for three areas of credit
portfolio management. First, the credit crisis has highlighted the need to man-
age the funding risk of a bank. Second, it has highlighted the need to manage
the underwriting risk of debt syndications. Finally, it has suggested the need to
understand the drivers of relationship banking.
The first paper in this dissertation develops an empirically grounded model
to manage the funding risk of assets with uncertain funding requirements. The
model simulates the expected and unexpected funding needs of a portfolio,
which can be term-funded in two ways. Static term funding is fixed over life
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of the asset and is conditioned on initial information. Dynamic term funding
changes over the life of the asset and is conditioned on information at future
adjustment dates. Dynamic term funding has less model risk and offers more
protection than static funding in most cases. The dynamic funding model is ap-
plied to the revolving credit portfolio of a large multinational investment bank
between December 2007 and December 2009. The dynamic funding model per-
formed very well in managing the funding risk of this loan portfolio during
this extremely stressful period. We also use simulation to compare the expected
funding cost under the short-term, static and dynamic funding frameworks.
The simulation suggests that the dynamic funding method has no significant
cost disadvantage as compared to the other two methods, while offering a bet-
ter framework for funding risk management.
The second paper in this dissertation develops an option pricing framework
to manage the underwriting risk in loan syndications. The underwriting risk
is modeled as an American put option on a debt instrument. The paper argues
that, due to the nature of these commitments, the price of an underwriting com-
mitment should lie somewhere between the price of an American put option
and a European put option on the debt instrument. We propose to price the
commitment as an American option because it is more conservative and better
protects the underwriter who aims to hedge this risk. A reduced form model is
used to price commitments as American options on defaultable securities. The
model is applied to two cases depending onwhether or not default swaps on the
borrower trade in the market. This novel framework can help banks to better
manage their debt underwriting risk.
The last paper in this dissertation studies the empirical determinants of re-
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lationship banking benefits. While numerous theoretical studies have identi-
fied the sources of relationship banking benefits, the empirical literature has
been constrained in testing these theories by the availability of data. Due to
the reliance on crude measures for relationship strength and benefit, the ex-
isting literature has provided mixed empirical evidence on various theoretical
claims and has not fully identified the sources of relationship benefit. Using
a proprietary dataset from a multinational bank, this paper develops compre-
hensive measures of relationship strength and precise measure of relationship
benefit to uncover the true sources of relationship benefit. Relationship benefit
is measured as the difference between the par value and the fair value of a loan
where the latter captures all the relevant risks. Relationship strength is mea-
sured along three dimensions namely relationship depth, relationship breadth,
and relationship potential. This paper finds that the borrowers benefit from a
lending relationship through better terms on their loan contracts. The relation-
ship benefit increases with relationship breadth and relationship potential but
doesn’t depend on relationship depth. While relationship potential is the most
important determinant of relationship benefit for informationally opaque firms,
relationship breadth is more important for the firms that are not so. This paper
also identifies several problems in the empirical specifications and the corre-
sponding results in the existing literature.
3
CHAPTER 2
DYNAMIC FUNDING FRAMEWORK FOR FUNDING RISK
MANAGEMENT
Until recently, the Investment Bank funded the majority of its trading assets on a
short-term basis and therefore at short-term rates. . . . . .Now, in order to encourage more
disciplined use of UBS’s balance sheet, the Investment Bank will fund its positions at
terms that match the liquidity of its assets as assessed by Treasury.
- UBS 2007 Letter to Shareholders
2.1 Introduction
The financial crisis of 2007-2009 has highlighted the importance of managing the
funding risk in a financial institution. Prior to the crisis, most banks were fund-
ing long-term assets with short-term funding. This was partly because short-
term funding was cheaper and partly because short-term funding provides a
better estimate of the uncertain funding requirements in a given period. How-
ever, short-term funding is subject to funding risk because the bank may not
be able to rollover its existing funding. Moreover, most banks maintained an
inadequate liquidity buffer to meet their unexpected funding needs. For ex-
ample, during the current crisis, banks couldn’t rollover their existing funding
due to concerns about their viability and their liquidity buffers were not enough
to meet unexpected funding needs such as drawdowns on credit lines and in-
creased collateral on derivative positions. Consequently, many banks perished
or came close to bankruptcy during this crisis.
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To better manage their funding risk, many banks, on their own accord or
prompted by credit agencies, are reducing their reliance on short-term financ-
ing and increasing their liquidity buffers (for example, see the quote from UBS
above). Moreover, international and national regulators are proposing rules
(under Basel framework) that require banks to maintain a sizeable liquidity
buffer and increase the amount of long-term funding. However, as argued be-
low, most of the approches being employed by banks or suggested by regulators
to manage the funding risk are based on stress scenarios and rules of thumbs
rather than being based on an empirically grounded predictive model.
The well known principle for mitigating funding risk is to match the matu-
rity of assets and funding. However, this principle is difficult to practice be-
cause many assets have uncertain funding requirements. One way to avoid this
funding uncertainity is to borrow long-term themaximumpossible funding that
could be needed for an asset. In effect, this approach implies a variable liquidity
buffer which can meet any possible funding need for the asset. However, this
approach is overly conservative (since so much funding would almost never be
needed on a portfolio basis) and overly expensive (since unused funds would
earn less than the opportunity cost1 most of the times).
This paper proposes a model to overcome the above problems in manag-
ing the funding risk of assets with uncertain funding requirements. The model
is developed in the HJM framework for forward spreads (e.g. [5]; [18]) and is
illustrated for revolving credit lines, but it can be readily adapted to other mod-
eling frameworks and asset classes. The model involves using historical data to
estimate the statistical relationship between credit spreads and revolver utiliza-
1For funds to be readily available when needed, unused funding has to be invested in liquid
government securities which earn less retun than the bank’s cost of raising those funds and
much less than the returns that could be generated if those funds were profitably invested.
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tion; simulating credit spreads over a funding horizon; and using the simulated
spreads and the estimated relationship between spreads and utilization to ob-
tain the revolver usage distribution and hence the expected and unexpected
usage (at a given confidence interval) over the funding horizon.
This model can be applied for funding risk management in two alternative
ways: static funding and dynamic funding. Static funding involves simulating
credit spreads and loan utilization to the loan maturity date using information
as of loan inception date. In other words, the funding horizon in static funding
is from the loan inception date to the loan maturity date. The expected and
unexpected usage are funded at the loan inception date with maturity equal to
thematurity of the loan. The unexpected funding is invested in long-term liquid
securities (such as government bonds) which acts as a liquidity buffer to meet
unexpected draws. Since the expected and unexpected usage is fixed through
the life of loan, the cost of funding is fixed unless unexpected usage is breached
during the life of the loan.
Dynamic funding involves adjusting the expected and unexpected usage at
periodic adjustment dates. At each adjustment date, credit spreads and loan
utilization are simulated till the next adjustment date using information as of
the current adjustment date. In other words, the funding horizon in dynamic
funding is from one adjustment date to the next adjustment date. The expected
funding is funded for the remaining tenor of the loan whereas the unexpected
usage is funded till the next adjustment date (a cushion period can be added
to avoid funding during a prolonged liquidity crisis). The unexpected funding
is invested in short-term liquid securities to serve as a liquidity cushion. If the
expected or unexpected usage simulated on a given adjustment date is more
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(or less) than that simulated on the previous adjustment date, the expected or
unexpected funding is increased (or decreased) by the difference in the numbers
simulated on these two dates. Since the dynamic funding changes over the life
of the loan conditional on spreads at future adjustment dates, the cost of funding
the revolver is uncertain as of the loan inception date.
Both of these funding approaches have their advantages and disadvantages.
Since the horizon over which spreads are simulated is shorter in dynamic fund-
ing, the usage distribution is narrower and the unexpected funding is lower for
a given confidence interval than in case of static funding. In other words, dy-
namic funding approach relies less on unexpected funding and depends more
on conditional expected funding. Moreover, dynamic funding has less model
risk and hence provides more precise estimates of funding requirements. This
is because dynamic funding has smaller model errors due to shorter simulation
horizon and because it partially corrects model errors due to periodic adjust-
ments with new information. In addition, any divergence between model and
reality can be more easily detected and corrected than in case of static fund-
ing. Finally, dynamic funding offers more protection against unexpected fund-
ing draws in a period of consistently high spreads and volatility. On the other
hand, static funding offers more protection against large temporary spikes in
usage over a short period. Static funding also locks in a cost of funding which
is not the case with dynamic funding. Overall, dynamic funding appears to be
a safer alternative in terms of funding risk management.
The dynamic funding model is applied to the entire revolving credit portfo-
lio of a large multinational investment bank between December 2007 to Decem-
ber 2009. Since this period coincided with one of the most severe financial crisis
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ever, it serves as a good test case to evaluate the performace of dynamic fund-
ing model. At the beginning of each quarter, CDS spreads and utilization were
simulated for the next quarter for each borrower in the portfolio, and the simu-
lated usage distribution of the portfolio was used to calculate the expected and
unexpected funding needs for the next quarter. At the end of each quarter, the
actual utilization was compared with the expected and unexpected utilization
projected in the last quarter, and the new funding projections were made for
the next quarter. The dyamic funding model performed very well in managing
the funding risk of this loan portfolio during this extremely stressful period. In
particular, the actual utilization never breached the expected plus unexpected
funding during the whole financial crisis. Also, the actual utilization increased
with higher CDS spreads and fell with lower CDS spreads, thus validating the
basic premise of the model that utilization is a function of spreads.
We also study the expected funding cost under the three funding methods:
a) short-term funding; b) static funding; and c) dynamic funding. A reduced
form credit risk model (e.g. [20]) is employed to estimate the expected funding
cost in each case and the effect of various model parameters is studied. The ex-
pected costs under the three funding methods are insignificantly different from
each other in scenarios where the funding spreads are close to their long term
values. In situations where funding spreads are far lower than their long-run
means, the model suggests that short-term funding is significantly more expen-
sive than dynamic and static funding, which is contrary to banks’ preference
for short-term funding in such environments (e.g during 2002-2006). Arguably,
this is because banks are focused on short-term profits, rather than taking a
long-term view of funding cost. On the other hand, in scenarios where fund-
ing spreads are larger than their long-run mean values, short-term funding is
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cheaper than static and dynamic funding, though in economic terms, the ben-
efit is marginal (less than 5% in our simulations). Therefore, dynamic funding
seems clearly preferable to static funding and short-term funding because it pro-
vides better funding risk management framework and offers no significant cost
disadvantages. Moreover, dynamic funding has lower unexpected funding than
the other two methods which may yield a cost advantage.
This paper is the first to suggest the use of dynamic funding approach for
funding risk management. As argued above, dynamic funding is superior to
static and short-term funding in this regard. Moreover, the dynamic funding
approach is superior to the approches currently being employed by banks or
suggested by regulators to manage the funding risk. For instance, the new Basel
rules for liquidity riskmanagement require banks tomaintain a liquidity coverage
ratio and a net stable funding ratio. The liquidity coverage ratio specifies the propor-
tion of investment in various asset classes that needs to be held in liquid assets
to meet the funding needs in the next 30 days. These proportions are derived
based on stress scenarios which are neither bank/portfolio specific nor seem to
be based on empirical experience. For instance, banks are required to hold 10%
of undrawn credit line limits in liquid assets to protect against drawdown in the
next 30 days. This number seems arbitrary, especially since there was no month
during this severe financial crisis wherein there was a drawdown of more than
3% of undrawn limit in the revolving credit portfolio of a large investment bank
studied in this paper2. Moreover, in the absence of a predictive model, there is
2One possibility is that the 10 % number is a cross-bank average. However, since the invest-
ment bank studied in this paper had lower than 10% drawdown in credit lines in any month
during this crisis, a cross-bank average of 10% implies that there must be some bank(s) with
drawdown of more than 10% in some month. For such banks, 10% may not be enough liquidity
cushion. On the other hand, 10% is too high a cushion for the bank studied in this paper. In both
cases, the ratio doesn’t serve its desired purpose because it is neither bank specific nor based on
an predictive model.
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no way to ascertain that a future financial crisis wouldn’t be more severe than
the current one and against which these liquidity ratios may prove ineffective.
On the other hand, net stable funding ratio proposes the proportion of investment
in various asset classes that needs to be funded with long-term liabilities. This
ratio doesn’t require the matching of maturity of the assets and liabilities since
any fundingwithmore than one year tenor qualifies as long-term funding. Con-
sequently, this ratio doesn’t go far enough in mitigating the funding risk. For
instance, if a bank funds all its long term assets with one year liability, a bank
may still face rollover risk if a severe financial crisis lasts more than one year.
Most of the literature on funding risk management is based on Asset-
Liability Management (e.g. [9]) which involves techniques such as gap analysis,
duration analysis, scenario analysis, stress tests and stochastic dynamic pro-
gramming tomanage the funding liquidity risk of a bank. Tomy knowledge, the
dynamic funding method has not been studied in this literature. [30] proposes
a static funding model wherein the revolver utilization depends on ratings. In
contrast, we propose a dynamic funding model wherein utilization depends on
spreads.
2.2 General Model
2.2.1 Evolution of CDS Spreads
Define hazard rate of borrower default h(t; T ) at time T as
h(t; T ) =
f(t; T )
1  F (t; T ) (2.1)
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where F (t; T ) = P (  T j > t) is the condition distribution of default time 
and f(t; T )= @
@T
F (t; T ) is the corresponding density. If P (t; T ) = 1   F (t; T ) =
P ( > T j > t) is the survival probability of a credit between time t and T , the
hazard rate expression can be written as
h(t; T ) =
f(t; T )
1  F (t; T ) =
1
P (t; T )
@
@T
(1  P (t; T ))
=   1
P (t; T )
@
@T
P (t; T )
=   @
@T
lnP (t; T ) (2.2)
= bfr(t; T )  fr(t; T ) (2.3)
which shows that hazard rate is equal to forward credit spread bfr(t; T ) fr(t; T )
where bfr(t; T ) and fr(t; T ) are the risky and riskless forward rates (see [18]).
Hence, hazard rate is analogous to forward rate in the term structure models
(e.g. [5]).
The above equation implies that
P (t; T ) = exp( 
Z T
t
h(t; s)ds) (2.4)
which suggests that the survival probability P (t; T ) between current time t and
any future time T can be readily calculated if hazard rate h(t; s) is known for
s 2 (t; T ). On the other hand, if the survival probabilities P (T0; T ) are known
for all T 2 fT0; :::Ti; :::TNg, CDS premium C(T0; TI) at time T0 for any maturity
TI   T0 can be calculated using the following expression3
C(T0; T
I)
 
IX
i=1
P (T0; Ti)Tidi
!
= (1 R)
IX
i=1
(P (T0; Ti 1)  P (T0; Ti))di (2.5)
where Ti is the day count fraction between CDS premium payments, R =
E(Rt) is the expected bond recovery rate, and dt are the riskless discount factors.
3See section (5) for more details.
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This expression relies on the fact that a CDS contract has zero value at inititation,
which implies that the expected value of premiums paid on the CDS contract
(left hand side of expression) must equal the expected value of losses in the
event of default (right hand side of expression)4.
Let the dynamics of hazard rate in the empirical measure be given by
dh(t; T ) = (t; T )dt+ (t; T )dWt +
NX
i=1
i(t; T )dN
i
t (2.6)
whereWt is a standard Brownian motion and N i are jump processes under the
empirical measure. As in [12], this jump process for forward spread must sat-
isfy no-arbitrage conditions on drift similar to the drift restrictions on forward
rates in the HJM model for interest rates (see [5]). We assume such no-arbitrage
conditions are satisfied. A subsequent section contains a parametric example of
this stochastic process.
Assume that hazard rates h(T0; T ) at time T0 are either exogenously given
or can be implied from market data5. The stochastic process in expression (2.5)
is used to simulate hazard rates from current time T0 at a future time T0 + u.
These simulated hazard rates h(T0 + u; T ) are used to calculate survival proba-
bilites P (T0 + u; T ) on the simulated path using expression (2.3). These survival
probabilities in turn are used to calculate CDS premiums C(T0 + u; TI) on the
simulated path using expression (2.4). This procedure can be used to simulate the
entire distribution of CDS spreads at a future point in time. As discussed in sub-
sequent sections, the simulated CDS spreads can be used to simulate utilization
and obtain funding needs for revolver loans6.
4This expression assumes that interest rates, recovery rate, and default time are independent.
These assumptions are market standard in the credit derivative market to bootstrap survival
probabilities.
5A subsequent section shows how these hazard rates can be calibrated to or implied from
market data.
6The simulated spreads can also be used to calculate the value-at-risk (VAR) of the loan
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2.2.2 Usage of a Loan Portfolio
The usage of a revolver is stochastic. The variation in loan usage is due to cor-
porate financial decisions which are not observed by the bank. In this paper,
usage is assumed to be dependent on the spread level and the expected uti-
lization of the loan. There is an economic justification for the dependence on
spreads because, at high spreads, it is cheaper to draw on the revolver than bor-
row using some other instrument. However, due to transaction costs and other
unobservable factors, the dependence of utilization on spreads is not totally op-
portunistic. In particular, borrowers do not draw down on the loan as soon as
their credit spread increases above the loan fees. This relation is modeled using
the following expression
U i;js = F
i;j(ej; q
i
s;s+s; U
i;j
s s;
 !x t) + "s (2.7)
where U i;js is the utilization of loan j 2 f1; 2; ::; Jig to borrower i 2 f1; 2; ::; Ig at
a time s, ej is the expected utilization of loan j, qis;s+s is the survival probability
of borrower i from time s to s + s,  !x t is a vector of variables that determine
loan utilization, and F i;j(:; :) is a deterministic function, and "s is an error term
which is identically and independently distributed across time, borrowers and
loans. The function F i;j may be non-linear.
The assumption that the utilization depends on default probability till next
period rather than later periods is made because the firm can always increase its
utilization when the default probability increases in the future. This expression
can also be written as
U i;js = F
i(ej; f
 1(Cis;s+s); U
i;j
s s;
 !x t) + "s
= Gi(ej; C
i
s;s+s; U
i;j
s s;
 !x t) + "s (2.8)
portfolio.
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where Cis;s+s is the CDS spread of borrower i at time s for maturity s and
f 1 is the inverse function obtained from expression (2.7). Historical data can be
used to estimate this relation if a specific functional form is assumed for Gi(:; :).
If there is limited data, the above expression can be assumed to have the same
form for all firms
U i;js = G(e
j; sis;s+s; U
i;j
s s;
 !x t) + "s (2.9)
A subsequent section employs a few functional forms for G() and estimates
panel data regressions of the form:
U i;jt = + e
j + sit;t+t + U
i;j
t t + 
 !x t + "t (2.10)
The CDS spreads Cis;s+s for borrower i for maturity s at a future time s is
simulated k 2 f1; 2; ::; Kg times at current time t using the model described in
previous section. The expected utilization ej and the simulated spreads s
i;k
s;s+s
can be used to obtain the usage U i;js (ej; s
i;k
s;s+s) at future time s for each loan for
each simulation using expression (2.7) . The portfolio utilization Ukp (s) at future
time s is calculated for simulation k as follows.
Ukp (s) =
IX
i=1
JiX
j=1
U i;jt (ej; s
i;k
s;s+s) (2.11)
The distribution of simulated portfolio usage Ukp (s), k 2 f1; 2; ::; Kg; can be
used to obtain the estimate of expected utilization U expp (s) and the utilization
UCI_p (s) at  confidence interval.
U expp (s) =
1
K
KX
k=1
Ukp (s) (2.12)
UCI_p (s) = inf(u 2 R : Pr(Ukp (s) > u) < 1  )
14
The unexpected utilization Uunexp__CIp at  confidence interval is given by
Uunexp__CIp (s) = U
CI_
p (s)  U expp (s)
The expected and unexpected utilization obtained above are used in the subse-
quent section to decide how to fund the portfolio.
2.2.3 Funding of the Loan Portfolio
The expected and unexpected usage of a loan portfolio can be term funded in
two ways namely static and dynamic funding. To show the difference between
these two alternatives, we modify the notation introduced in previous section.
Let U expp (sjt) and Uunexp__CIp (sjt) be the expected usage and unexpected usage at
 confidence interval respectively for portfolio p at a future time s obtained from
simulation at time t. Consider a portfolio of L loans containing loans with loan
maturity liwhere i 2 f1; 2; ::; Lg. Consider nmaturity time points fl0; l1; l2; ::; lng
where l0 < l1 < ::: < ln and l0 = 0. Divide the loan portfolio into sub-portfolios
such that all loans with li 2 ( lk 1; lk] are categorized into the sub-portfolio de-
noted as Lk.
Static Funding
In static funding, the expected funding F expLk (sjt) and the unexpected funding
and F unexp__CILk (sjt) at  confidence interval for sub-portfolio Lk at a future time
s obtained from simulation at time t are given by
F
exp
Lk
(sjt) = U expLk (lkj0) if 0  s < lk
= 0 otherwise (2.13)
15
F
unexp__CI
Lk
(sjt) = Uunexp__CILk (lkj0) if 0  s < lk
= 0 otherwise (2.14)
Note that these expressions imply t = 0 and s = lk which means that the
expected and unexpected funding are fixed on the loan issuance date and do not
change subsequently till all the loans in that sub-portfolio mature (assuming no
new loans enter that portfolio). In other words, credit spreads and utilization are
simulated till the loan maturity date using information as of the loan inception
date. The expected and unexpected utilization from the simulation is funded
for the maturity of the loan and these funded amounts remain fixed through
the life of the loan. A graphical illustration is included in Figure 2.1 for a loan
with three year maturity. At time 0, spreads and usage are simulated till time 3
and the expected and unexpected usage are funded for three years maturity.
Dynamic Funding
To illustrate dynamic funding, assume that there are n + 1 funding adjustment
time points f0; ta; 2ta; :::ntag such that ta > 0 and nta < ln < (n+1)ta. In dynamic
funding, the expected and unexpected funding are given by
F
exp
Lk
(sjt) = U expLk (mtaj(m  1)ta) if s; t 2 [(m  1)ta;mta]
= 0 otherwise (2.15)
F
unexp__CI
Lk
(sjt) = Uunexp__CILk (mtaj(m  1)ta) if s; t 2 [(m  1)ta;mta]
= 0 otherwise (2.16)
where m is any integer such that m  n. The expected funding F expLk (mtaj(m  
1)ta) is funded for maturity lk   (m   1)ta, which is the maximum remaining
16
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maturity for the sub-portfolio Lk. If the expected funding F
exp
Lk
((m + 1)tajmta)
differs from that in the previous period F expLk (mtaj(m   1)ta), the difference is
either funded (if the difference is positive) or unwound (if the difference is neg-
ative) for maturity lk  mta. The unexpected funding F unexp__CILk (mtaj(m   1)ta)
is funded for maturity ta or ta + lc where lc is a cushion period to avoid funding
during liquidity crisis.
In words, dynamic funding involves adjusting the expected and unexpected
usage at periodic adjustment dates. At each adjustment date, credit spreads and
loan utilization are simulated till the next adjustment date using information as
of the current adjustment date. The expected utilization from the simulation is
funded for the remaining maturity of the loan whereas the unexpected usage is
funded till the next adjustment date (a cushion period can be added to avoid
funding during a future liquidity crisis). The unexpected funding is invested
in short-term liquid securities. If the expected or unexpected usage simulated
on a given adjustment date is more (less) than that simulated on the previous
adjustment date, the expected or unexpected funding is increased (decreased)
by the difference in the numbers simulated on these two dates.
Dynamic funding is illustrated graphically in the next two figures. Assume
there is a 3 year loan and the funding adjustment period is one year. At time
0, spreads and usage are simulated till time 1 to obtain the expected and unex-
pected usage. The expected funding is funded for three year maturity whereas
unexpected funding is funded for one year period7. Figure 2.2 illustrates this
case.
At time 1, assume that the spreads have risen higher and the utilization has
7If liquidity crises need to be avoided and the maximum time a liquidity crisis may last is
one year, unexpected funding could have two years maturity.
18
reached U1. Spreads and usage are simulated till time 2 given the spreads at
time 1 to obtain the expected and unexpected usage at time 2. Since the spreads
at time 1 are higher, the expected usage at time 2 would be higher than that
at time 1. The difference between these numbers is the incremental expected
funding required and it is funded with 2 year maturity. Likewise any difference
in unexpected funding is funded for one year maturity. Figure 2.3 illustrates
this case.
Comparison between Static and Dynamic Funding
The law of iterated expectations implies that
U
exp
Ln
(ntaj0) = E0(::::E(n 3)ta(E(n 2)ta(U expLn (ntaj(n  1)ta))))
= E0(U
exp
Ln
(ntaj(n  1)ta)) (2.17)
where we have assumed ln = nta. In words, the static funding for a loan with
maturity ln = nta is equal to the the iterated expectation at time 0 of the dynamic
funding for that loan at time nta obtained at time (n   1)ta. So the static and
dynamic funding are inextricably linked.
However, these two alternatives differ significantly from the viewpoint of
funding risk management. Since the horizon over which spreads are simulated
is shorter in dynamic funding, the usage distribution is narrower and the un-
expected funding is lower for a given confidence interval than in case of static
funding. In other words, dynamic funding approach relies less on unexpected
funding and depends more on conditional expected funding.
The twomodels also differ in their performance because of model risk. If the
model used for simulating spreads is not a complete representation of reality,
19
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the static funding is more likely to diverge from reality than dynamic funding
because it simulates the data over a longer horizon andmore unmodeled events
can occur over a longer horizon than over shorter horizon. On the other hand,
dynamic funding partially corrects itself periodically using the information at
the adjustment dates. Hence the model risk is much higher with static fund-
ing. Moreover, because of the shorter simulation horizon in dynamic funding,
any divergence between model and reality can be more easily detected and cor-
rected using subjective views than in case of static funding. Figure 2.4 illustrates
graphically howmodel risk exacerbates the funding shortfall in the case of static
funding as compared to that in the case of dynamic funding.
For a given confidence interval, dynamic funding offers more protection
against unexpected funding draws in a period of consistently high spreads and
volatility such as during the credit crunch in 2007-2009. To see this, consider
a simple example which is not meant to be rigorous but illustrative. Assume
that the usage distribution is i.i.d normal over successive periods8. Assume that
the model estimated expected funding is 50% at both the 3 month horizon and
the 4 year horizon and the model estimated standard deviation is 1% for the 3
month horizon and 4% for the 4 year horizon. These numbers ensure that the
variance in utilization over four year static funding period is equal to the vari-
ance in utilization over sixteen successive 3 month dynamic funding periods.
These numbers imply that, at 97.5% confidence interval, the unexpected fund-
ing is 2% for 3 month horizon and 8% for 4 year horizon. If the usage increases
by 2% in each 3 month period, the unexpected usage will always be met by the
8The i.i.d. assumption is not valid in this model if spreads are mean reverting. The normal
distribution assumption can lead to usage that is less than 0% or greater than 100% which is
impossible. A beta distribution can be used to restrict the usage values between 0 and 1 but
the additivity of beta variates is complex. This simple example is just for illustration and is not
meant to be rigorous.
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dynamic unexpected funding of 2% but the unexpected usage of 32% at the end
of 4 years will be much higher than the static unexpected funding of 8%. Figure
2.5 illustrates this case graphically.
On the other hand, static funding offers more protection against large tem-
porary spikes in usage over a short period. In the above example, if usage jumps
by 5% in a given adjustment period but falls subsequently, the dynamic unex-
pected funding cannot meet this temporary surge whereas static funding can.
However, most credit crises involve long periods of high spreads and volatility
rather than short-term spikes in spreads across borrowers.
Overall, dynamic funding appears to be a safer alternative than static fund-
ing in terms of liquidity risk management. In particular, static funding is likely
to havemuch larger model risk than dynamic funding and it providesmuch less
flexibility in incorporating current market information and subjective views in
the analysis. Dynamic funding also offers more protection than static funding
in most stress cases.
In terms of costs, static funding cost is fixed over the life of the loan unless the
unexpected funding amount is breached. On the other hand, dynamic funding
cost varies because the funded amount and the cost of purchasing incremental
funding change over the life of the loan. However, as noted earlier, unexpected
funding cost for dynamic funding is cheaper than that for static funding because
the former has lower unexpected funding. A subsequent section uses simula-
tion to compare the funding cost in these two cases.
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2.3 Application of the Dynamic Funding Model
This section illustrates the application of dynamic funding model using data
from a large multinational investment bank.
2.3.1 Simulation of Spreads
Credit spreads are simulated using a stochastic model of hazard rates which
is a special case of the general model discussed in Section 2.2. The model is set
in discrete time with time steps f1; 2; ::; t; ::; s; ::; s1; :::; s2; ::; Tg. The discrete time
hazard rate hs1;s2(t) at time t for maturity interval fs1; s2g is given by the discrete
time equivalent of expression (2.2)
hs1;s2(t) =
  ln

qs1 (t)
qs2 (t)

s2   s1 (2.18)
where qs(t) = P (t; s) is the survival probability till time s as of time t. This
expression implies that discrete time survival probability qs(t) is given by the
discrete time equivalent of expression (2.3)
qsn+1(s1) = P (s1; sn+1) = exp
 
 
nX
i=1
hsi;si+1(s1)
!
(2.19)
The survival probabilities qs(t) can be obtained from CDS spreads observed
in the market. Since the value of CDS contract is zero at inititation, the expected
value of premiums paid on the CDS contract must equal the expected value of
losses in the event of default
E
"
nX
i=t+1
1f>igCn(t)
#
= E
"
nX
i=t+1
1f=ig(1 Ri) exp
 
 
iX
j=t+1
rj
!#
(2.20)
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where Cn(t) is the CDS spread at time t for default protection till time n 2 ft +
1; t + 2; ::::; T ), and Rn is the bond recovery rate. If interest rates, recovery rate
and default time are independent, expression (2.19) simplifies to
Cn(t)
 
nX
i=t+1
qi(t)di(t)
!
= (1 R)
nX
i=1
(qi 1(t)  qi(t))di(t) (2.21)
where R = E(Rt) is the expected bond recovery rate. Noting that qt(t) = dt(t) =
1, the above expression can be used to bootstrap qi(t); i 2 ft + 1; t + 2; ::::; Tg;
from the T equations corresponding to CDS spreads at T maturities.
Using the survival probabilities qs(t) implied from CDS spreads at time t,
hazard rates hs1;s2(t) at time t for s1; s2 2 ft+1; t+2::::Tg can be calculated using
expression (2.17). Given these hazard rates at time t , we now specify the model
to simulate hazard rates at time t+ n. The general framework for credit spread
simulation discussed in Section 2.2 had two components: a diffusion term and
a jump term. Here, we model the diffusion term using the HJM framework for
hazard rates ([5];[18]) and model jumps in hazard rates using structural credit
risk modeling approach ([8];[21]). The structural credit risk approach is used to
model defaults and ratingmigrations and the reduced form credit risk approach
is used to model changes in spread from rating migrations and otherwise. In
other words, this is a hybrid jump-diffusionmodel where the diffusion is driven
by a reduced form model and the jumps are driven by a structural model.
Assume that asset price A follows geometric Brownian motion which im-
plies that, in discrete time, the return r from a firm’s assets is given by
rt+t =
At+t   At
At
= t+ 
p
t"t+t (2.22)
which can be normalized as
ert+t = rt+t   t

p
t
= "t+t (2.23)
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where "t+t is an i.i.d. standard normal random variable.
The normalized return ert+t is assumed to be given by
ert+t = "t+t =  NX
i=1
wixi +
p
1  2e" (2.24)
where xi are N systematic factors and e" is a standard normally distributed idio-
syncratic factor. The systematic factors, which could be any macroeconomic or
financial factors that explain the asset return, are assumed to be normally dis-
tributed with covariance matrix . The 2 term is the proportion of the normal-
ized return explained by systematic factors andwi are the weights on systematic
factors. The  term ensures that ert+1 has standard normal distribution.
Assume there are M + 1 ratings f1; 2; :::;m; ::;M; dg with default rating d.
For the time horizon t, let pij be the probability of migrating from rating i to
rating j calculated using historical data. Then the cumulative probability of a
credit with rating i being between rating 1 and rating k in t time period is
given by
i;k =
kX
j=1
pij (2.25)
Estimate parameters for each credit and simulate the independent normally
distributed idiosyncratic factor and simulate the systematic (industry and coun-
try) factors from a normal distribution with covariance matrix  to obtain the
residual term ert+1 as per the expression above. A credit with rating i migrates
to rating k if
i;k 1 < N(ert+t)  i;k (2.26)
where N(:) represents the cumulative standard normal distribution.
The effect of rating migration on CDS spreads is modeled using generic CDS
spread curves. Roughly speaking, generic CDS spread for a given rating for a
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given maturity is the median CDS spreads for that maturity across borrowers
with that rating (see next section for more details). Using these generic CDS
spread curves, generic survival probabilities qs(t; r) for time s at time t for rating
r are obtained using expression (2.20). Then the generic survival probabilities
qs(t; r) are used to obtain generic hazard rates hs1;s2(t; r) at time t for rating r for
maturity interval (s1; s2) using expression (2.17).
The percentage hazard rate change during time intervalt can be written as
ln

his1;s2(t+t;m(t+t))
his1;s2(t;m(t))

= ln

his1;s2(t;m(t+t))
his1;s2(t;m(t))

+ ln

his1;s2(t+t;m(t+t))
his1;s2(t;m(t+t))

(2.27)
where his1;s2(t;m(t)) is the hazard rate at time t for borrower i with rating m(t)
at time t for maturity interval (s1; s2). This expression just states the fact that
percentage hazard rate change during time intervalt is due to ratings changes
and non-rating changes.
We assume that hazard rate changes for borrower i due to rating migration
are given by
ln

his1;s2(t;m(t+t))
his1;s2(t;m(t))

= ln

hgs1;s2(t;m(t+t))
hgs1;s2(t;m(t))

(2.28)
where hgs1;s2(t;m(t)) is the hazard rate at time t for generic curve with ratingm(t)
for maturity interval (s1; s2).
We also assume that hazard rate changes for borrower i due to reasons other
than rating migrations are given by
ln

his1;s2(t+t;m(t+t))
his1;s2(t;m(t+t))

= ai(s1; s2)(b
i(s1; s2)
  ln  his1;s2(t;m(t+t))t
+i(s1; s2)"
h
t+t (2.29)
29
where ai(s1; s2), bi(s1; s2) and i(s1; s2) are parameters that can be estimated
from historical hazard rates (implied from historical CDS spreads) of the bor-
rower and "h is given by
"ht+t = !t+t +
q
1  2"it+t (2.30)
where ! and "i are macro and firm-specific factors respectively with a standard
normal distribution and 2 is the proportion of variance explained by the sys-
tematic factor. The systematic factor could be a credit index or any other rele-
vant factor. The  term can be estimated as the correlation between hazard rates
of the borrower and the systematic factor9.
The last four expressions state that the percent hazard rate change has two
components. The first component is the percent hazard rate change due to any
change in ratings and it is assumed to be equal to the percent difference in haz-
ard rates of the generic curve of new and old ratings. The second component is
the percent hazard rate change due to reasons unrelated to rating change and it
is assumed to have a mean reverting component and a stochastic component.
Using the simulated hazard rates hs1;s2(t + s) at a future time t + s, the risk-
neutral survival probabilities qsi(t+s) at time t+s are calculated using expression
(2.18). The risk neutral probabilities qsi(t + s) in turn are used to calculate the
CDS spreads Cn(t + s) at time t + s using expression (2.20). The CDS spreads
simulated in this section are used in the subsequent sections to simulate usage
and obtain the funding needs for the revolver portfolio10.
9A correlation between the systematic factor ! and the systematic factors xi can be intro-
duced if necessary.
10The simulated spreads can also be used to calculate the value-at-risk (VAR) of the loan
portfolio which includes not only realized losses from defaults but also unrealized losses from
spread movements.
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Implementation of the Model
Expression (2.23) is estimated using country and industry factors as systematic
factors xi. The estimation involves regressing the normalized stock index re-
turns for these countries and industries on normalized stock returns of the bor-
rower. The coefficients of this regression represent the factor weights wi and
the R-square of this regression represents the proportion  of borrower returns
explained by systematic factors. Since there are several hundred borrowers in
the loan portfolio of the bank whose data is used here, the estimation results
of these hundreds of regressions are not reported to conserve space. The rating
transition matrix used in expression (2.24) is standard in credit models and are
regularly published by rating agencies such as Moody’s.
Generic CDS spread curves used in expresssion (27) are created for each rat-
ing for a given day by grouping borrower CDS spread curves of that rating on
that day, removing outlier spreads, and identifying the median spread for each
maturity. These median spread curves for various ratings are then smoothed to
remove kinks and eliminate cross-over of curves across ratings. The resulting
curves are generic curves for each rating on that day.
The estimation of expression (2.28) is complicated by the fact that many bor-
rowers either do not have traded CDS or do not have long enough history of ob-
served CDS spreads. Therefore, we assume that parameters ai(s1; s2), bi(s1; s2)
and i(s1; s2) in expression (2.28) are same for all borrowers i with the same rat-
ing. To further simplify the implementation, we assume that these parameters
do not depend on hazard rate maturity (s1; s2). These assumptions imply
ai(s1; s2) = a
r (2.31)
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Table 2.1:
Estimation of Parameters for Hazard Rate Diffusion
This table provides the panel data estimates for expression
(2.34):The dependent variable is generic bond spread for
each rating. The independent variables are a mean reversion
term ar, a long term mean term br, and a volatility term r.
All coefficients are significant at 1% level.
Variable AAA AA A BBB BB B
ar 0.37 0.24 0.19 0.44 0.49 0.51
br 4.61 5.07 5.22 5.32 5.93 6.28
r 0.37 0.34 0.33 0.36 0.44 0.43
bi(s1; s2) = b
r (2.32)
i(s1; s2) = 
r (2.33)
where ar, br and r are the common parameters for all borrowers with rating r.
These parameters are estimated using the following expression
ln

sr(t+ 1)
sr(t)

= ar(br   ln (sr(t))) + rh"ht+t (2.34)
where sr(t) are the generic bond spreads for rating r at time t. Note that the
above expression modifies expression (2.28) by using expressions (30)-(32) and
replacing his1;s2(t)with s
r(t). The hazard rate his1;s2(t) is replaced by generic bond
spread sr(t) because of the above assumption that parameters br0, br1 and rh do
not depend on hazard rate maturity (s1; s2). The generic bond spread data used
for estimation is obtained for each rating between 1991 to 2007 from Bloomberg.
The estimation results for each rating are included in Table 2.1.
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Table 2.2
Summary Statistics For Utilization and Spread Data
Variable Name Mean StdDev Median
utilization 0.18 0.32 0
expecteddrawn 0.28 0.32 0.13
1y_spread (bps) 205 3493 38
2.3.2 Utilization
This section estimates the empirical behavior of loan utilization. We use three
sets of data for this purpose. The first set of data contains the details of long-
term investment grade loans issued by a large multinational bank between Oc-
tober 2003 and June 2008. The second set of data contains the utilization on
these loans at monthly frequency from October 2003 to July 2008. The third set
of data consists of the CDS spreads of the borrowers of these loans. The number
of loans in the first data set varies from 200 to 1000 in any given month.
The summary statistics for the sample is included in Table 2.2. The median
utilzation is 0 implying that most facilities in the sample are undrawn most of
the time. The expected utilization is higher than actual utilization on average
indicating that the expected utilization of the loan indicated at the time of loan
issuance is biased upward on average11. The 1 year CDS spreads is about 205
bps on average though its median value is only 38 bps.
Table 2.3 contains the estimation results. Model 1 includes expected utiliza-
tion and current period 1 year CDS spread as explanatory variables. This model
11Expected utilization is an indicative variable provided at loan issuance by the relationship
manager who maintains the bank’s relationship with the borrower.
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Table 2.3
Empirical Determinants of Utilization
This table provides the panel data estimates for equation (14).
The dependent variable is current period utilization. AIC and BIC
are functions based on the log likelihood.of the estimation with
lower values representing better model fit. Standard errors are
included in paranthesis. (*** Significant at one percent level, **
Significant at five percent level, * Significant at 10 percent level)
Model_1 Model 2 Model 3
AIC 33953 -95764 -59227
BIC 33973 -95745 -59208
30 day prior usage 0.8539***
(0.001728)
90 day prior usage 0.7743***
(0.002231)
expecteddrawn 0.5685*** 0.0891*** 0.138***
(0.002) (0.0014) (0.0019)
current 1yr spread (bps) 0.000154*** 0.000043*** 0.000094***
(0.000002) (0.0000016) (0.0000017)
suggests that a 100 bps increase in CDS spread results in a 1.54% absolute in-
crease in utilization rate. There could be two reasons for this result. First, banks
may be utilizing loans depending on whether it is costlier to draw on the re-
volver or raise money in the bond market. This is the opportunistic behavior
hypothesis. Second, an increase in spread may correspond to lower credit wor-
thiness of the borrower which may make it more difficult to raise money else-
where. This is the credit constraint hypothesis. The data doesn’t allow us to
differentiate between these two hypothesis.
The other twomodels in Table 3 include lagged utilization as an independent
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variable in addition to expected utilization and CDS spread. In Model 2, the
lagged variable is 1 month prior utilization and in Model 3, the lagged variable
is 3 month prior utilization. First note that including lagged utilization reduces
the sensitivity on expected utilization and CDS spread as compared to the case
where there is no lagged utilization. About 70-80% of the current period uti-
lization is explained by the previous period utilization. Comparing the results
of Model 2 and Model 3 shows that, as the lag period increases, the coefficient
on lagged utilization falls, and the sensitivity to expected utilization and CDS
spread increases. The pattern of increasing sensitivity to spreads and decreasing
sensitivity to lagged utilization as the lag period increases suggests that borrow-
ers either respond to spreads with a lag or respond only to permanent changes
in spreads.
2.3.3 Dynamic Funding
The revolving credit portfolio of a large investment bank is subjected to the
dynamic funding model with quarterly adjustment periods between December
2007 and December 2009. Since this period coincided with one of the most se-
vere financial crisis ever, it is a good test case to evaluate the performace of
dynamic funding model.
At the beginning of each quarter, one year CDS spreads for all borrowers in
this portfolio were simulated one quarter into the future using the hazard rate
simulation model discussed in Section 2.3.1. The simulated spreads, current re-
volver utilization, and expected revolver utilization are plugged into Model 3
estimated in Section 2.3.2 to obtain the one quarter ahead utilization for each re-
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volver in each simulation. The revolvers are divided into different tenor buckets
based on the remaining tenor of each loan. The portfolio utilization is calculated
for each tenor in each simulation, which results in the simulated usage distri-
bution for that tenor. The usage distribution for each tenor is used to obtain
the expected utilization for each tenor and these expected amounts are term
funded to match the tenor of that bucket. The simulated usage distribution is
also obtained for the whole portfolio (without segregating by tenor). This dis-
tribution is used to obtain the expected utilization and unexpected utilization
(at 99% confidence interval) for the whole portfolio. The unexpected utilization
is funded in liquid securities. At the end of each quarter, the actual utilization
of the whole portfolio is recorded and the expected and unexpected funding for
the next quarter are calculated using the above steps.
The results of this exercise are included in Figure 2.6. Actual utilization was
about 15% in December 2007 and the model projected the expected funding to
be about 15% and the unexpected funding to be about 3% for March 2008. The
actual utilization in March 2008 of about 16% was higher than expected utiliza-
tion, which was presumably because of the high CDS spreads during the Bear
Sterns rescue period. The high spreads and utilization in March 2008 resulted in
higher expected funding projection of about 17% for June 2008. However, actual
utilization fell to 15% in June 2008, which coincided with tighter spreads in June
2008. Due to lower spreads and utilization in June 2008, the model projected
lower expected utilization of 16% for September 2008. However, actual utiliza-
tion increased to about 17% in September 2008, which coincided with high CDS
spreads during the Lehman bankruptcy. Due to such high spreads and utiliza-
tion in September 2008, the model projected higher expected utilization of about
18% for December 2008. Actual utilization increased more than the expected
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Figure 2.6 Application of Dynamic Funding Model on Real Data
funding to about 19% in December 2008, which was the peak of the financial
crisis with CDS spreads at their peak. Based on the high utilization and spreads
in December 2008, the model projected expected utilization of about 20%, but
the actual utilization fell in March to about 17%. Since then, both actual and
expected utilization have been falling each quarter coinciding with falling CDS
spreads and general improvment in the economy.
Note that the actual utilization never breached the expected plus unexpected
funding during the whole financial crisis. This suggests that the dyamic fund-
ingmodel performedwell in managing the funding risk of loan portfolio during
this extremely stressful period. Also, the actual utilization increasedwith higher
CDS spreads and fell with lower CDS spreads, thus validating the basic premise
of the model that utilization is a function of spreads. Finally, observe that the
expected utilization for the next quarter is slightly higher than the actual uti-
lization of the current quarter (by about 1-2%). There are two reasons for the
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higher expected utilization. First, actual utilization doesn’t include expected or
actual utilization during default. Second, the multivariate model above involv-
ing spreads and utilization uses information from facilities with high spreads to
give richer predictions of expected utilization.
2.4 Expected Funding Costs
In this section, we study how the expected funding cost varies depending on
the fundingmethod. We look at three fundingmethods: a) short-term stochastic
funding; b) long-term static funding; and c) long-term dynamic funding.
2.4.1 Model
To study the expected funding cost under various methods, we use the reduced
form credit risk modeling approach (e.g. [20]). Let rt be the riskless short rate
and bt be the intensity of the Cox process governing default of the borrower.
Assume that the risk-neutral dynamics of the intensity process bt is given by
the square root process
dbt = (
b   bt)dt+ b
q
btdW
b
t
= (
b   bt)dt+ b
q
btdW
b
t (2.35)
where b, b and b are positive constants, !b is the fractional loss given default,
and W bt is a standard Brownian motion. This process allows for mean rever-
sion with long-run mean 
b
= 
b
b
and guarantees that the intensity is always
nonnegative.
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Let s(t; T ) denote the CDS premium at time t for buying default protection
on the borrower for maturity T . Equating the present value of the premium leg
of CDS and the present value of the protection leg of a CDS, we can solve for
the CDS premium.and apply the results in [6] to obtain:
sb(t; T ) =
Et
h
!(
R t+T
t
Qu exp
   R u
t
(rs + 
Q
s )ds

du)
i
Et
h
(
R t+T
t
exp
   R u
t
(rs + 
Q
s )ds

du)
i (2.36)
where ! is constant fractional loss given default.
Since bt has a square root process, the CDS premium sb(t; T ) in the above
expression has a closed form solution given by (see [10] for a proof):
sb(t; T ) =
!b
R t+T
t
exp(Bbu
b
u)Dt(G
b
u +H
b
u
b
u)duR T
0
Abu exp(B
b
u
b
u)Dudu
(2.37)
where
Abu = exp

b(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b)
(b)2
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
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2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Assume that the intensity ft of the Poisson process governing default of the
bank has risk-neutral dynamics given by a square root process
dft = (
f   ft)dt+ f
q
ft dW
f
t
= (
f   ft )dt+ f
q
ft dW
f
t (2.38)
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where f , f and f are positive constants with 
f
= 
f
f
, !f is the fractional loss
given default, andW ft is a standard Brownian motion such that corr(W b;W
f
t ) =
.
The CDS spread for the bank sf (t; T ) at time t for maturity T , is given by
equations (22-27) with bt , b, 
b, b and !b replaced by ft , f , 
f , f and !f
respectively. Given the correlation  between the two Brownian motions, the
funding spread sf (t; T ) and the borrower CDS spreads sb(t; T ) are correlated as
well.
2.4.2 Expected Cost of Alternative Funding Methods
Now consider a loan with notional limit M and remaining maturity T with a
drawn portion utM and an undrawn portion (1  ut)M at time t. The borrower
pays commitment fee c on the undrawn amount and a base rate Lt plus margin
m on the drawn amout. The bank funds the drawn portion of the loans at the
base rate Lt plus the funding spread f st at time t. Assume that the current time
is t0 and the loan runs from t0 to tN = t0 + T . Also. assume that the loan is
drawn and the fees on the loan are paid at discrete times t 2 ft0; t1; :; tn; :; tNg.
The expected funding cost of a loan VF (tn) at time tn represents the present
value of funding cost incurred by the bank in the form of funding spread pay-
ments f st for the remaining life of the loan. We consider three specifications of
the funding leg. The first specification involves long-term static fundingwhereby
the bank purchases a fixed funding amount uM = E0(utM) at a funding spread
f st = s
f (tn; T ). In other words, the static funding amount is equal to the ex-
pected utilization on the loan and the static funding spread is equal to the CDS
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spread on the bank at time t for maturity T . In this case, the value of funding
leg VF (tn) at time tn is given by:
VF (tn) =
NX
i=n+1
Etn

exp

 
Z ti
tn
bsds

exp

 
Z ti+1
tn
rsds

uMsf (tn; T )ti
(2.39)
Note that this expression assumes that, if the borrower defauts between two
coupon payment dates, the bank has to pay the funding cost sf (tn; T ) for that
period but can stop paying the funding cost thereafter. In other words, this ex-
pression assumes that, in the event of default, funding for the loan can be sold
at sf (tn; T ). This is obviously a simplification since bank’s funding spreads may
not be sf (tn; T ) when the borrower defaults. However, since this specification
has constant funding amount (uM ), constant funding spread (sf (tn; T )) and con-
stant funding cancellation spread (sf (tn; T )), it contrasts and helps illustrate the
effect of variable funding amount, variable funding spread and variable fund-
ing cancellation spread in the other two specifications.
The second specification involves short-term stochastic funding wherein the
bank purchases a fixed funding amount uM = E0(utM) and rolls over the fund-
ing each period at the prevailing next period funding spread sf (ti; ti+1), which
is random. If the borrower defaults between two periods, there is no need to
cancel funding in this case because the existing funding need not be rolled over
to the next period. Most banks were funding their assets this way prior to the
current financial crisis. The value of funding leg in this case is given by:
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VF (tn) =
NX
i=n+1
Etn

exp

 
Z ti
tn
bsds

exp

 
Z ti+1
tn
rsds

sf (ti 1; ti)ti

uM
(2.40)
The third specification involves long-term dynamic fundingwherein the fund-
ing amount utM is variable and the incremental funding in each perod ui ui 1
is purchased or sold at the random funding spread sf (ti; T ) for the remaining
loan tenor.
VF (tn) =
NX
i=n+1
Etn
264 exp

  R ti
tn
bsds


exp

  R ti+1
tn
rsds

(ui   ui 1)sf (ti 1; T )ti
375M (2.41)
Comparing the last three expressions, note that calculating funding cost is
more complicated for dynamic funding than for static funding and short-term
stochastic funding. For example, if there is a positive correlation between bor-
rower spread and funding spread, if the CDS spread of borrower falls next pe-
riod resulting in lower funding need for a loan, the funding cost of the loan in-
creases since the incremental funding amount is likely to be unwound at lower
funding spread. On the other hand, if there is a negative correlation between
the two spreads, funding cost is likely to fall when borrower spreads fall. The
opposite holds if borrower spreads are likely to rise. Therefore, the funding
cost depends on the interaction between utilization, borrower spread and the
correlation between funding and borrower spread.
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2.4.3 Simulation Procedure
Since the last two expressions have no closed form solution, we use simulation
to calculate the funding cost for the three different ways of funding a loan. For
simplicity interest rate rt is assumed to be zero12. We consider a one year loan
and assume that utilization changes can be done once a quarter. For the default
intensity of borrower and funding spreads
dt = (  t)dt+ 
p
tdWt (2.42)
with d = 4=2 > 1 13, we simulate from the exact transition density of the
square root process on the time grid tn < tn+ 1
365
< tn+ 2
365
< ::: < tn+1 as follows
(see [17] for a proof)
t
i+ 1365
= c[(Z +
p
Y )2 +X] (2.43)
where
c = 2(1  e (ti+ 1365 ti))=4 (2.44)
Y = tie
 (t
i+ 1365
 ti)
=c (2.45)
Z  N(0; 1) (2.46)
X  2d 1 (2.47)
To simulate the time to deafult  for the square root process, we simulate a
uniform random varibale 0  U  1 and find  = tn+ 
365
where  is given by
 1X
i=1
t
n+ i365
<   ln(U) 
X
i=1
t
n+ i365
(2.48)
12Assuming constant or stochastic interest rates that are independent of default intensity does
not affect the qualitative results in this section.
13For interest rate and credit models, d is typically larger than 2 (see Glasserman 2003, pp
125). Therefore, we do not consider the case where d < 1 which requires a different simulation
procedure.
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where s is a default intensity path from time tn onwards simulated using the
above simulation procedure.
Quarterly changes in utilization ut are assumed to be given by the following
expression which is estimated using data referred to in Section 2.3.2.
ut+0:25 = minf1; ut + 0:0087[sb(t+ 0:25; T )  sb(t; T )]g (2.49)
where sb(t; T ) is estimated using expression (2.36) based on s simulated using
the above simulation procedure.
So the simulation involves: using expressions (34) and (37) respectively to
draw paths of borrower default intensity bs and funding spread intensity 
f
s
with correlation corr(W b;W ft ) =  on the time grid tn < tn+ 1
365
< tn+ 2
365
< ::: <
tn+1 given initial intensities btn and 
f
tn ; using expression (2.47) to calculate the
time to default  on each path; using expression (2.36) to calculate the borrower
spread sb(tn + 0:25n; T ) and funding spreads sf (tn + 0:25n; T ) in each quarter
n 2 f0; 1; 2; 3; 4gwhere there is no default; using expression (2.48) to calculate the
utilization in each quarter; and calculating the funding cost in the three cases as
per expressions (38), (39) and (40).
The base parameter values for the simulation are: btn = 1:67% and 
f
tn =
0:83%, corr(W b;W ft ) =  = 0:5, b = 50%, f = 40%, !b = !f = 40%, 
b =
7:5 , f = 9:6, 
b
= 1:67%, 
f
= 0:83%. These base parameter values imply
initial 1 year spreads of sb(tn; tn+1) = 1% and sf (tn; tn+1) = 0:5%. In addition
to the simulation with base parameter values, multiple simulations were run
involving a change in one of the base parameters while other parameters were
left unchanged.
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2.4.4 Simulation Results
Table 2.4 contains the simulation results with 250,000 simulations for the base
parameter case (wherein initial borrower and funding spreads coincide with
corresponding long-term mean values). In terms of point estimates, stochastic
funding is the cheapest followed by static funding and dynamic funding. How-
ever, in terms of statistical significance, the expected funding cost under the
three methods are not significantly different from each other14. Even if we can
statistically estimate the ranking of these funding costs, the economic difference
between these funding costs is negligible15 (less than 0.25% even after factoring
three standard errors from the point estimates). So from a cost perspective, the
banks should be indifferent between these three funding methods especially in
the scenarios where the current borrower and funding spreads are close to their
long term values.
Next, we study the effect of various parameters on the expected funding
cost under the three methods. Since the purpose of this exercise is study how
the funding cost under a given funding method changes for different parameter
values rather than compare the funding cost across the three funding methods
(which is difficult as discussed above), we run 10,000 simulations in each case
with the same random numbers in each simulation. This simulation strategy
reduces the computational time while allowing (qualitative rather than statisti-
14Several million simulations are needed to reliably estimate the relative ranking of these
funding costs. As discussed in Schonbucher (2003, pp 215-216), the direct simulation of default
times is difficult because the low probablity of default requires more than a million simula-
tions to reliably estimate. Therefore, he recommends simulation using the branching to default
method (Schonbucher 2003, pp 217-218). We implemented the branching to default method
with 50,000 simulations and the three funding costs were still not statistically different from
each other.
15While correlation between default intensity and interest rate may result in statistically sig-
nificant difference in the three funding costs, the empirical correlation between these variables
is not large enough to make the difference economically significant.
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Table 2.4
Simulation Results for Base Parameter Values
This table provides the simulation results for the
expected funding cost under various funding
methods for the base parameter case.
(*** represents significance at one percent level)
Funding Method Expected Funding Cost Std. Error
Stochastic Funding 0.1986047*** 0.00008
Static Funding 0.1986644*** 0.00003
Dynamic Funding 0.1986972*** 0.00003
cal) comparison of the funding costs under each method for various parameter
values. Figures 7-17 contain the results of these simulations. The first point to
note from these figures is that, for the base parameter case, the expected funding
costs between the three methods are not significantly different from each other
in statistical terms, even though stochastic funding is more expensive than dy-
namic and static funding in terms of point estimates. The other observations
from these figures are noted below.
Spread correlation: The effect of spread correlation  on funding cost under
the three methods is illustrated in Figure 2.7. Correlation has no effect on sta-
tic funding (expressions 38) costs because both the price and amount of funding
is fixed upfront. In the case of stochastic funding (expressions 39), the value of
funding leg decreases with correlation. This is because, with higher correlation,
borrower intensity is on average higher when funding intensity is high, which
implies higher probability of borrower default. Therefore in environments with
high funding spreads, funding costs are lower because the borrower defaults
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Figure 2.7 Effect of Borrower and Funding Spread Correlation
more often and hence funding costs are incurred less often. On the other hand,
in scenarios with low funding spreads, borrower defaults less often and hence
funding cost is incurred more often when correlation is higher. However, be-
cause the long run funding spread is low in the base parameter case and since
funding spread is bounded below by zero, the scenarios with higher funding
spread have a larger impact on the average funding cost. Therefore, for the base
parameter case, the net effect is that funding cost falls with higher correlation.
In contrast, the funding cost increases with correlation in the case of dynamic
funding (expressions 40). This is because higher correlation implies that when
funding spread is high, borrower spreads are high which implies more utiliza-
tion at a timewhen funding cost is high and low utilizationwhen funding cost is
low. The effect of higher utilization dominates the effect of lower borrower de-
fault probability resulting in higher funding cost. Of course, the opposite holds
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Figure 2.8 Effect of Initial Funding Intensity on Funding Costs
in scenarios where funding spreads are low, but as discussed above, the effect
of high spread environments is higher on average funding cost, thus resulting
in higher dynamic funding cost with higher correlation.
Initial funding intensity: The effect of initial funding intensity ftn on fund-
ing cost under the three methods is illustrated in Figure 2.8. When funding
spread intensity at time 0 is high, the funding spread at time 0 is high. There-
fore, funding cost increases with higher funding intensity at time 0 for all the
three methods. When the initial funding spread is above the long run mean
funding spread, the increase in funding cost is higher in the case of static and
dynamic funding because most or all of the funding in these cases is purchased
at time 0 when the intensity is high whereas in the case of stochastic funding
the initial funding intensity has less impact because funding is rolled over every
quarter and mean reversion pulls down the subsequent funding spreads on av-
erage. The opposite holds when initial funding spread is below long run mean
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funding spread because dynamic and static funding help lock in cheap funding
in such a case whereas stochastic funding requires purchasing more expensive
funding in future due to mean reversion.
Initial borrower default intensity: The effect of initial borrower default intensity
btn on funding cost under the three methods is illustrated in Figure 2.9. In all the
three methods, the funding cost goes down with higher inital borrower default
intensity. This is because initial higher default intensity implies higher default
probability and hence the loan has to be funded for a shorter duration on aver-
age. If the initial borrower default intensity is higher than the long-run mean
borrower default intensity, mean reversion implies that the expected future bor-
rower spread is lower than the case where the inital and the long-run value of
borrower default intensity are about the same. Therefore, in such a scenario, less
funding is required and hence the funding cost falls more with dynamic fund-
ing than with static and stochastic funding because utilization falls with lower
future borrower spreads. The opposite holds if inital borrower default intensity
is lower than the long run mean borrower default intensity.
Funding intensity volatility: Figure 2.10 shows that the loan funding cost under
the threemethods converges to the same value as the funding intensity volatility
f goes to zero. This is because if the funding volatilty is zero (with everything
else same as in the base parameter case), the funding intensity is always equal
to the initial and long-run mean funding intensity of 0.83%, which implies a flat
and constant term stucture of funding spreads. In such a case, loan funding cost
is obviously same under the three methods.
Borrower default intensity volatility: Figure 2.11 suggest that the loan funding
cost decreases with borrower default intensity volatility b under all the three
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Figure 2.9 Effect of Initial Borrower Intensity on Funding Costs
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Figure 2.10 Effect of Funding Spread Volatility on Funding Costs
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Figure 2.11 Effect of Borrower Spread Volatility on Funding Costs
methods. However, as is well known, higher volatility of default intensity re-
duces the default probabilities under the square root model due to the expo-
nential effect, which in turn should imply a higher funding cost. The opposite
result here is due to small sample bias.
Borrower Loss Given Default: The effect of borrower LGD !b on funding cost
under the three methods is illustrated in Figure 2.12. If borrower loss given de-
fault increases and the inital and long-run mean borrower default intensity re-
main unchanged, borrower spread increases which implies higher funding cost
in the case of dynamic funding because funding amount increases with higher
spread under this fuding method. For the other two methods, the funding cost
remains the same, because the funding amount and funding spread remains the
same.
Funding Loss Given Default: The effect of funding LGD !f on funding cost
under the three methods is illustrated in Figure 2.13. If funding loss given de-
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Figure 2.12 Effect of Borrower Loss Given Default on Funding Costs
fault increases and the inital and long-run mean funding intensity remain un-
changed, funding spread increases and hence funding cost is higher in all the
three methods.
Borrower default intensity mean reversion: Figure 2.14 suggests that the ex-
pected funding cost increases with the borrower default intensity mean rever-
sion b under all the three methods. However, as is well known, higher mean re-
version of default intensity increases the default probabilities under the square
root model, which in turn should imply a lower funding cost. The opposite
result here is due to small sample bias.
Funding intensity mean reversion: The effect of funding intensity mean rever-
sion f on funding cost under the three methods is illustrated in Figure 2.15.
As funding intensity mean reversion increases to infinity, loan funding cost un-
der the three methods converges to the same value. This is because any ran-
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Figure 2.14 Effect of Borrower Mean Reversion on Funding Costs
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Figure 2.15 Effect of Funding Mean Reversion on Funding Costs
dom change in funding intensity in a given period is reversed (on average) in
the next period due to infinite mean reversion, which implies that the expected
funding intensity is the same in each period and hence the term structure of
funding spreads is flat and constant. Therefore, with infinite mean reversion,
the expected funding cost is the same irrespective of which funding method is
used.
Long run mean borrower default intensity: Figure 2.16 shows that, under all the
three funding methods, funding cost is lower if the long run mean borrower
default intensity 
b
is higher (with the same initial borrower default intensity).
This is because a higher long run mean of borrower default intensity implies
a higher probability of borrower default, which in turn implies lower funding
cost because the loan is likely to be alive for a shorter duration. If the long-
run mean borrower default intensity is higher than the inital borrower default
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Figure 2.16 Effect of Borrower Long Run Mean Intensity on Funding
intensity, mean reversion implies that the expected future borrower spread is
higher than the case where the long-run mean and the initial value of borrower
default intensity are about the same. Therefore, in such a scenario, more fund-
ing is required and hence funding cost is higher with dynamic funding than
with static and stochastic funding because utilization increases with higher fu-
ture borrower spreads. The opposite holds if long-run mean borrower default
intensity is lower than the inital borrower default intensity.
Long run mean funding intensity: The effect of long run mean funding inten-
sity 
f
on funding cost under the three methods is illustrated in Figure 2.17.
When long run mean of funding intensity is high (for the same initial funding
intensity), the funding spread is high. Therefore, under all the three methods,
funding cost of a loan is high when the long run mean of funding intensity is
high. If the long run mean funding intensity is higher than the inital funding
intensity, the initial funding spread is lower than the expected future funding
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Figure 2.17 Effect of Funding Long Run Mean Intensity on Funding
spread due to mean reversion. Therefore, it is cheaper to purchase (most of or
all) funding upfront in such a case, which implies that dynamic and static fund-
ing are cheaper than stochastic funding when long run mean funding intensity
is higher than intial funding intensity. The opposite holds when long run mean
funding intensity is lower than intial funding intensity.
Discussion
As discussed above, in the base parameter case, the expected funding costs un-
der the three funding methods is not significantly different from each other.
Moreover, except for the cases where the initial finding intensity and the long-
run mean funding intensity are significantly different from each other, none of
the parameter changes causes these expected costs significantly different from
each other. Therefore, from a cost perspective, the banks should be indiffer-
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ent between these three funding methods, especially in the scenarios where the
funding spreads are close to their long term values. However, as discussed in
previous sections, dynamic funding is better than static funding which in turn
is better than stochastic funding from the perspective of funding risk manage-
ment. Therefore, banks should prefer dynamic funding especially in the cases
where the funding spreads are close to their long-term values.
In environments where the current funding spreads are significantly lower
than the long-term funding spreads, stochastic funding is significantly more
expensive than dynamic and static funding. This suggests that, from a cost per-
spective, banks have an incentive to use long-term funding in low spread envi-
ronments. However, in reality, banks tend to prefer short-term funding in low
spread environements such as 2002-2006. This suggest that, in low spread envi-
ronments, banks take a short-term view of saving funding cost in the short-term,
while ignoring the long-term view that they may need to purchase future short-
term funding at high costs due to mean reversion. A long-term view would
suggest that banks should fund long-term in low spread environments.
On the other hand, in high spread environments, stochastic funding is
cheaper than static and dynamic funding. However, in economic terms, the ben-
efit of short-term funding is marginal (less than 5% in our simulations). More-
over, as is clear from the current financial crisis, long-term funding is far su-
perior to short-term funding in terms of funding risk management. Therefore,
even in high spread environments, it is prudent for banks not to use short-term
funding.
The expected costs under static and dynamic funding are not significantly
different from each other in any of the scenarios simulated above. Therefore,
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dynamic funding seems clearly preferable to static funding since the former
method provides better funding risk management framework and offers no sig-
nificant cost disadvantages as compared to the latter method.
2.5 Conclusion
The current financial crisis has highlighted the need to manage the liquidity risk
of a bank. Prior to the crisis, most banks were funding long-term assets with
short-term funding. However, during the current crisis, banks couldn’t rollover
their existing funding due to concerns about their viability. Consequently, many
banks perished or came close to bankruptcy during this crisis.
To better manage their funding risk, many banks are reducing their reliance
on short-term financing and increasing their liquidity buffers. Moreover, inter-
national and national regulators are proposing thumb rules and stress scenar-
ios (under Basel framework) that require banks to maintain a sizeable liquidity
buffer and increase the amount of long-term funding.
This paper proposes an empirically grounded predictive model to manage
the funding risk of assets with uncertain funding requirements. The model is
estimated for revolving credit lines, but can be readily adapted to other asset
classes. The model involves simulating CDS spreads and revolver usage over
the funding horizon based on an empirically estimated model. The simulated
usage distribution is used to obtain expected and unexpected usage of the re-
volver, which can be term funded in two alternative ways: static funding and
dynamic funding.
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Static term funding is fixed over life of the loan and is conditioned on initial
spreads. Dynamic term funding changes over the life of the loan and is condi-
tioned on spreads at future adjustment dates. Dynamic term funding has less
model risk and offers more protection against unexpected draws in high spread
environment whereas static funding offers more protection from large tempo-
rary spikes in utilization.
The dynamic funding model is applied to the revolving credit portfolio of
a large multinational investment bank between December 2007 and December
2009. The dyamic funding model performed very well in managing the funding
risk of this loan portfolio during this extremely stressful period. The actual
utilization never breached the expected plus unexpected funding during the
whole financial crisis.
We also use simulation to compare the expected funding cost under the
short-term, static and dynamic funding frameworks. The simulation suggests
that the dynamic funding method has no significant cost disadvantage as com-
pared to the other two methods, while offering beter framework for funding
risk management.
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CHAPTER 3
MANAGING THE UNDERWRITING RISK IN DEBT SYNDICATIONS
3.1 Introduction
During the current financial crisis, investment banks lost a significant amount
of money on leveraged loan commitments. Banks were sitting on a huge port-
folio of leveraged loan underwritings at the time of Lehman bankruptcy, and
couldn’t syndicate these commitments due to market meltdown. As a result
many banks had to issue debt to leveraged borrowers at below market prices,
resulting in billions of dollars in losses. Since banks did not properly hedge
these commitments prior to the crisis, their losses on commitments were not
offset by gains on hedges.
This paper proposes an option pricing framework for pricing and hedg-
ing such underwriting commitments. The underwriting risk is modeled as an
American put option on a debt instrument. We argue that, given the nature of
these commitments, the price of an underwriting commitment should lie some-
where between the price of an American put option and a European put option
on the debt instrument. We propose to price the commitment as an American
option because it is more conservative and better protects the underwriter who
aims to hedge this risk.
A reduced form model (e.g. [20]; [18]) is used to price these commitments
as American options on defaultable securities. The model is applied to two
cases depending on whether or not default swaps on the borrower trade in the
market. Examples are presented for both cases to illustrate the model.
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To my knowledge, there has been no research in the literature on pricing
and managing underwriting commitment risk. This framework can help banks
manage such commitment risk conservatively and systematically as opposed to
their arbitrary and often sporadic hedging prior to the financial crisis.
3.2 Model
Assume that the debt being syndicated has indicative pricing features given
by the set I . The set I could include features such as notional, currency, fixed
or floating loan, coupon, recovery rate, amortization schedule, call protection,
Libor floors etc. In other words, any feature that affects pricing. Let the indica-
tive original issue discount be given by OI 1. The indicative issue price of the
commitment 100 OI is the underwriter’s best estimate of where the debt with
idicative features I would clear if it were issued today.
Assume that the bank has signed an underwriting commitment at time t on
this debt for period T years. If the debt is part of an acquisition, the borrower has
to satisfy the terms of the acquisition (such as regulatory approvals etc) during
the period T before the loan can be effective or funded. If the debt is not part of
an acquisition, period T is the syndication period during which the underwriter
attempts to syndicate the debt.
Assume that the underwriter has the ability to flex2 some of the features of
the debt during the syndication. Let the flex features be given by the set F . Basi-
1Original issue discount is the amount paid below par at issuance. For example, if the loan
is issued at 98, the original issue discount is 2.
2The word flex derives from the flexibility an underwriter has in syndicating the commit-
ment.
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cally, the set F includes how much of each pricing feature the underwriter may
change to syndicate the loan. For example, the underwriter may increase the
coupon, change the amortization schedule, shorten the maturity etc. Assume
further that the original issue discount can be flexed to OF .
Let the price of this debt at time s 2 (t; T ) for pricing set I be given by Vs(I).
Likewise, the debt price for pricing set F at time s be given by Vs(F ). Assume
that the debt becomes effective at time s 3. The loss Ps(F ) to the underwriter on
the debt effective date s is given by
Ps(F ) = max(100 OF   Vs(F ); 0)N (3.1)
where N is the underwritten notional. The model assumes that if the syndica-
tion fails the underwriter is left with all the debt4. Since the underwriter can flex
to pricing set F , this formula says that the underwriter can lose money only if
the debt price with maximum flex Vs(F ) on effective date s has fallen below the
lowest debt price 100 OF at which the debt can issued.
Note that Ps(F ) in expression (3.1) is the payoff of a put option on debt Vs(F )
with strike 100 OF . If the debt effective date swere known with certainity, the
underwriting commitment with payoff Ps(F ) could be priced as a European put
option. However, in reality, the effective date s is uncertain. For acquisition re-
lated underwritings, this is partly because there is uncertainity in meeting the
conditions for closing the acquisition and partly because the borrower may not
3In the case of debt underwritings related to acquisitions, the debt becomes effective when
the borrower satisfies the conditions for closing the acquisition and decides to fund the debt.
For other debt underwritings, the debt becomes effective when the syndication is completed
and the loan is issued (either at the end or during the syndication period).
4This implies that there is a market clearing price for the syndication and, at this clearing
price, the underwriter can either sell down all the debt it expects to syndicate or cannot sell any
of the debt. Note that the underwriter may have an expected hold amount which it doesn’t
want to sell due to relationship reasons.
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immediately fund the debt after the acquisition has closed. For other underwrit-
ings, this is partly because there is uncertainity about how long the syndication
will last and partly because the borrower may not immediately fund the debt
after the syndication is complete. This uncertainity suggests that the underwrit-
ing commitment could be priced as an American put option. While the exercise
date s is not fully in control of the borrowers, they do have some control over
the process and can exercise this option rationality in some of the cases5. These
observation suggests that the price of an underwriting commitment should lie
somewhere between the price of an American put option and a European put
option with payoff as per expression (3.1).
We price the commitment as an American option because it is more conserv-
ative and better protects the underwriter who aims to hedge this risk6. In cases
where the borrower exercises the option irrationally, there is a windfall gain to
the underwriter who uses American option price to hedge the risk. On the other
hand, if the borrower exercises the option rationally, there is a loss to the under-
writer who uses European option price to hedge the risk.
Following [20], let rt be the riskless short rate and t be the intensity of the
Cox process governing default of the borrower. Let ! be the fractional loss given
default of the borrower. Assume for simplicity that the riskless rate, default
intensity and loss given default are independent of each other. Assume that
the risk-neutral dynamics of the intensity process t is given by the following
5Most underwriting commitments have ticking fees that are paid during the commitment
period, which may incentivize the borrower to do a rational early exercise of the option.
6Another alternative is to price the commitment as a put option with random exercise time.
While this technique may better capture the price of the commitment, we choose a conserva-
tive pricing approach because the commitment is usually originated and hedged by different
business divisions, which creates incentives for conservative transfer pricing between the two
divisions.
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process
dt = (t; t)dt+ (t; t)dW
Q
t (3.2)
where (t; t) and (t; t) are the risk neutral drift and volatility of the inten-
sity prcocess, and WQt is a standard Brownian motion under the risk neutral
measure. Assume that (t; t) and (t; t) are such that the intensity is always
nonnegative.
The price of the underwriting commitment VF (tn) expressed as an American
option is given by
VF (tn) = sup
tt+T
EQt

1f>g exp

 
Z 
t
rsds

P(F )

(3.3)
where  is the default time of the borrower. Following the results in Lando
(1998), the above expression simplifies to
VF (tn) = sup
tt+T
EQt

exp

 
Z 
t
sds

exp

 
Z 
t
rsds

P(F )

(3.4)
3.3 Application of the Model with Examples
In this section, we parameterize the general model in previous section. We ap-
ply the model to two cases where the default swaps on the borrower trade or do
not trade in the market. Examples are presented for both cases to illustrate the
model.
3.3.1 Parameteric Model
We employ Schonbucher’s ([18]) extension of Hull and White’s ([13]) reduced
model of interest rates that incorporates default risk. The risk-neutral dynamics
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of the risk-free short rate rt and the default intensity process t are given by the
Gaussian models:
drt = (t   rt)dt+ dWQt (3.5)
dt = (t   t)dt+ dWQt (3.6)
where  and  are the mean reversion coefficients, t and t are time-dependent
parameters,  and  are the local volatilities, and Wt and W t are the standard
brownian motions for the two stochastic processes respectively. Assume further
that the recovery rate in the case of default is a constant R. As discussed below,
the time dependent parameters kt and kt are used to calibrate the intial term
structure of default-free and defaultable interest rate. For simplicity, we assume
that the correlation between the two Brownian motions (Wt;W t) = 0.
A recombining trinomial tree is implemented for risk free interest rate as
proposed by Hull and White in [13]. A trinomial tree with branch to default is
implemented for default intensity as proposed by Schonbucher in [18]. The first
step towards building these trees is to define the auxiliary processes rt and 

t
given by
drt =  rt dt+ dWQt (3.7)
dt =  tdt+ dW
Q
t (3.8)
which imply that
rt = r

t + t (3.9)
t = 

t + t (3.10)
where t and t are non-stochastic and time-dependent.
The next step is to build the trees for these auxiliary processes rt and 

t as
depicted in Figure 3.1. Given the auxiliary risk-free rate rt at time t, the auxiliary
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riskless rate at time t + t rises to rt + rt on the up node with probability pu,
stays at rt on the middle node with probability pm, and falls to rt  rt on the
down node with probability pd. Along the tree, the auxiliary short interest rate
r(n; j) at time nt and node j is given by rt + jrt. The tree for auxiliary
default intensity t has a branch for default with probability p and a branch for
survival with probability 1  p. On the survival branch, this tree has up, middle
and down nodes similar to the auxiliary riskless rate tree but with jump t
rather than rt and with probabilities p0u, p0m, and p0d rather than pu, pm, and pd.
pu pm
pd
p'u
p
1- p
p'm
p'd
r*t
r*t+Δr
r*t -Δr
λ* t+Δλ
λ* t -Δλ
λ* t
Figure 3.1 Trees for Auxilliary Riskless Rate and Default Intensity
Assuming rt = 
p
3
p
t, the probabilities pu, pm, and pd can be calculated
by matching the first and second moments of the auxiliary short rate tree to
the first and second moments of the continous time process of r (see [13] for
details)7. Likewise, p0u, p0m, and p0d can be calculated using t = 
p
3
p
t.
The final step is to combine the two trees and use forward induction to cali-
brate the model to match the term structure of default free and defaultable bond
7Note that the two trees are flat at the top and the bottom. This branching method was
proposed by Hull andWhite ([13]) to match the first moments at very high and low levels of the
tree where the mean reversion effect is very high. The probabilities of three branches originating
from such nodes are different for those on other nodes (see [13]).
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prices using t in Expression 3.9 and t in Expression 3.10. The details of the cal-
ibration can be found in [18]. Using the calibrated tree, options on defaultable
loans such as the one in Expression 3.4 can be priced using backward induction.
3.3.2 Investment Grade Bridge Committments for Acquisition
Finance
Loans to investment grade borrowers generally do not trade in the market.
However, most of these borrowers have liquid bonds and CDS traded in the
market. Using these bond prices or CDS spreads, we can imply the default
probabilities and calibrate the default intensity process for these borrowers
Assume that the term structure of interest rates is flat at 2% with a local
volatility  of 10% and zero mean reversion. Assume that a borrower has a
1% bps flat term structure of bond spreads. Assume that the borrower wants
to finance an acquisition and requests its bank to issue a bridge commitment
of $100 which provides funding if the acquisition closes successfully during a
fixed commitment period, say three months. Assume that the requested bridge
has a tenor of one year and the borrower would pay Libor plus 2% if the bridge
is funded. Assume for simplicity that the bridge is non-cancellable. Finally
assume that the borrower pays an upfront fee of 100 bps on the bridge funding
date and a signing fee of 200 bps on the commitment signing date.
Clearly, if the bridge were to fund today, it would have a value above par
since the bridge spread of 2% above libor is more than the bond spread of 1%.
In such a case, the bank would willingly enter into the bridge. However, this
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bridge is a contingent security that can fund any time during the next three
months. If the borrower’s bond spreads are much more than 2% when the
bridge is funded, resulting in loan value below 99 (par minus upfront fee of
100 bps), the bank would incur a loss while funding the bridge. The expected
value of all such potential losses is captured by the option price in Expression 4.
The option price represents the expected losses to the bank from committing to
the bridge. If the option price is less than the bridge signing fee of 200 bps, the
bank still gains by making the committment. If the option price is more than
200bps, the bank may still commit to the bridge to the borrower if it has a past
relationship or expects future revenues from the borrower (the next chapter on
relationship banking provides evidence to support this view).
Assume that the local volatility for the borrower is a constant 25% and the
mean reversion coefficient is 0.2. The term structure of interest rates and bond
spreads can be used to obtain the default-free and defaultable bond prices,
which along with the volatilities of interest rate and default intensity assumed
above, can be used to calibrate the tree model discussed in the previous section.
The forward price of the bridge including upfront fee is slightly below 1028 and
the strike price is 99 (par less upfront fee). The commitment price (without the
bridge signing fee) is 216 basis points.
Figure 3.2 contains a sensitivity analysis of the commitment price to various
model parameters. As expected from option pricing theory, the commitment
price increases with commitment tenor and volatility of default intensity and
decreases with interest rates and mean reversion of default intensity.
8Loan margin of 2% and bond spread of 1% imply a surplus of 1% over 1 year tenor, which
along with upfront fee of 1% and discounting implies a loan price slightly below 102.
68
Effect of Intensity Vol on Commitment Price
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Figure 3.2 Effect of Model Parameters on Commitment Price
3.3.3 Leveraged Loan Underwriting Commitments
While leveraged loans trade in the market, in most cases, there are not enough
traded loans for a borrower to extract the term structure of loan spreads. In
some cases, theremay be no traded loan for a borrower in themarket. Therefore,
we consider the case where the borrower has one loan or no loan traded in the
market.
If there is no traded loan for a borrower, the starting point of the calcula-
tion is to obtain the indicative issue price of the commitment. As discussed in
Section 3.2, given the indicative original issue discount OI , the indicative issue
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price of the commitment 100   OI is the underwriter’s best estimate of where
the loan with indicative features I would clear if it were issued today. The un-
derwriter does comparative fundamental analysis of the borrower against its
peers to come up with the indicative price. In absence of any other informa-
tion, the indicative price 100 OI for indicative pricing set I is the best available
information to extract the term structure of loan spreads. Thus the case with
no traded loan is equivalent to the case with one traded loan since both cases
involve starting with the price of one loan.
Of course, one loan doesn’t contain enough information to extract the term
structure of loan spreads. To resolve this problem, we identify the relevant index
for the borrower. For example, if the borrower is fromNorth America, the index
could be LCDX for a loan commitment and CDX High Yield index for bond
commitment. As discussed below, the relevant index is used to obtain the slope
of the term structure of loan spreads.
The calibration involves equating the borrower curve to the index curve and
making parallel shifts to this curve till the loan price under consideration is
matched. Specifically, the initial index curve implies a term structure of de-
faultable debt prices which is compared to the bond price under consideration.
If the implied bond price for the required maturity doesn’t match the traded
or indicative bond price, the initial curve is shifted in a parallel manner and
the corresponding term structure is compared to the traded or indicative bond
price. This process is continued till the two prices match. The calibrated loan
spread curve has the same slope as the underlying index and is able tomatch the
traded or indicative bond price. The interest rate curve, calibrated loan spread
curve along with assumptions on volatilities of interest rate and default inten-
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sity are used to calibrate the tree model discussed in the previous section.
Assume that the interest rate parameters are same as in previous section. As-
sume that the leveraged loan commitment is non-cancellable, has an indicative
coupon of 2%, indicative loan tenor of 1 year, indicative loan price of 101 and
commitment period of 3 months. Assume that the relevant index (with same
recovery as the indicative loan) is flat at 4%. Since the relevant index is flat,
and there is no market information about the borrower, we assume a flat loan
spread curve for the borrower. A flat 1% curve matches the indicative loan price
of 1019.
Leveraged loan commitments usually have flex (flexible) terms. For exam-
ple, the borrower may allow the bank to syndicate at a margin of up to 3% and
an issue price of up to 98 even though the indicative margin is 2% and the in-
dicative issue price is 101. In some cases, the bank may also have the ability to
reduce the tenor of issued loan. Figure 3.3 illustrates the effect of flex parameters
on commitment price. As one would expect, the commitment price decreases
with more flexibility in increasing margin and issue discount as well as more
flexbility in decreasing loan tenor. Figure 3.3 also illustrates the obvious result
that the commitment price increases as the current loan spread increases (or
indicative loan price decreases) because there is less flexibility left to syndicate.
9Loan margin of 2% and loan spread of 1% imply a surplus of 1% over 1 year tenor which on
discounting implies a loan price slightly below 101.
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Effect of Loan Spread on Commitment Price
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Effect of Loan Margin on Commitment Price
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Figure 3.3 Effect of Flex Parameters on Commitment Price
3.4 Conclusion
The current financial crisis has highlighted the need for banks to better hedge
their underwriting risk since banks lost billions of dollars on such underwrit-
ings without offseting gains on hedges. This paper proposes an option pricing
framework for pricing and hedging this risk. The underwriting risk is mod-
eled as an American put option on the underlying debt. Using reduced form
pricing, the model is applied to two cases depending on whether or not default
swaps on the borrower trade in the market. This framework can help banks
manage commitment risk conservatively and systematically as opposed to their
arbitrary and often sporadic hedging prior to the financial crisis.
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CHAPTER 4
THE SOURCES OF RELATIONSHIP BANKING BENEFITS
4.1 Introduction
Relationship banking has been studied extensively as a means to resolve the
information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders (see [2] for a compre-
hensive review). The financial intermediation theory suggests that banks can
avoid the adverse selection of poor quality borrowers by screening borrowers
through costly information production and can overcome the borrower moral
hazard of sub-optimal investment by monitoring the borrower’s investment de-
cisions ([7], [23]). Besides increasing the availability of credit to the borrower by
removing information asymmetries, a banking relationship can also lead to bet-
ter loan contract terms for the borrower ([15],[14], [3]) due to the production of
borrower-specific durable and reusable information ([2]). On the other hand,
relationship banking can be costly to the borrower if the bank may "holdup"
the borrower and extract informational rents due to information asymmetries
between the borrower and other lenders ([26], [22]).
Empirical literature has tried to test these theories but has been constrained
by the availability of data (see [25] for a review). While event studies such as [4]
and [27] show an increase in a firm’s stock price on the announcement of a bank
loan, these studies show the existence of relationship benefit not the sources of
this benefit. To determine the sources of this benefit, empirical researchers have
relied on crude measures for relationship strength and benefit since the true val-
ues of these variables are not publicly observed. As discussed in the following
paragraphs, the use of these crude measures has yielded mixed empirical sup-
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port for the claims made in the theoretical literature and has not fully identified
the sources of relationship benefit.
This paper uses precise measures of relationship benefit and strength rather
than crude proxies to uncover the true sources and extent of relationship benefit
to borrowers. We overcome the limitations of the extant empirical literature by
using a proprietary dataset, obtained from a multinational univeral bank, that
contains detailed relationship information.
The existing literature measures relationship benefit as lower loan fees (e.g.
[16]), or lower collateral requirement (e.g. [29]), or more credit availability (e.g.
[1]). However, none of these measures by themselves or taken together imply
a relationship benefit unless the borrower’s default risk and recovery rate has
been controlled for and all the options in the loan contract are accounted for.
Since the borrower’s default risk is not observed by researchers, the extant liter-
ature uses crudemeasures such as bank prime rate and generic default premium
to control for default risk whereas loan recovery rates and embedded options
are ignored due to lack of data. Therefore, the relationship benefit claimed in
these studies may not be the actual relationship cost viewed by the bank either
because the researchers have not controlled for all risks and loan features (giv-
ing an illusion of relationship benefit where none exists) or because the banks
are irrational (banks may be mis-pricing the loan without realizing that they are
giving benefit to borrowers)1.
In contrast, this paper measures relationship benefit as the difference be-
tween the par value and the fair value of a loanwhere the fair value is calculated
using the market implied default probabilities, collateral-dependent recovery
1Many banks hold their loans at par on the accrual book, which may obscure the true cost of
providing the loan.
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rates, and loan features including any embedded options. In other words, we
use a dollar measure of relationship benefit after controlling for all risks and
loan features rather than any of the crude measures used in the literature. This
dollar measure is the actual relationship benefit to the borrower because it is a
real cost incurred by the bank with an explicit understanding that it is a cost for
the bank2.
We find that the fair value of loans in our dataset are generally lower than
the par value of loans, suggesting that borrowers obtain the relationship benefit
through better terms on the loan contract. Specifically, the loan rate is much
lower than the borrower credit spread after controlling for recovery rates and
embedded options in the loan contract.
Relationship strength has been measured in the existing literature using one
or more of the following measures: the length of the relationship (e.g. [1]); the
use of bank’s other financial services besides loans (e.g. [16] ); and the propor-
tion of loans provided by the bank to the borrower in the recent past (e.g. [29]).
However, none of these measures precisely capture the strength of banking rela-
tionship. Length of a relationship doesn’t measure the depth or breadth of a re-
lationship. Dummy variables for the use of bank’s other financial services don’t
measure the extent of the use of those financial services. Finally, the proportion
of loans provided by the bank to the borrower in the recent past neither cap-
tures the breadth of the banking relationship nor perfectly measures the depth
of the lending relationship because it ignores the internal and/or regulatory sin-
gle borrower concentration limits which affect this proportion. Moreover, none
of these measures capture the future potential of a relationship.
2The bank that provided the data follows the practice of fair valuing its loans. Hence any
value below par is recognized by the bank as a loss.
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In contrast, this paper measures relationship strength using relationship
depth, relationship breadth, and relationship potential. Relationship depth is
measured as the annual revenue generated from all existing loans issued to the
borrower by the bank. Relationship breadth is measured as the annual revenue
generated from all non-loan products and services purchased by the borrower
from the bank. Relationship potential is measured as the revenue expected to
be generated in the next one year across all products and services provided to
the borrower by the bank. The first variable measures the depth of the lending
relationship, the second variable measures the scope of the banking relationship,
and the third variable measures the future potential of the relationship. These
dollar measures capture the extent of the relationship along various dimensions
not just the presence or length of a relationship as is captured by the dummy
variables used in the existing literature.
Why should relationship potential matter? [28] argue that repeated inter-
action of the bank with the borrower produces reusable and properitary infor-
mation about the borrower that can help the bank win future loan business and
other fee generating business from the relationship borrower. [24] and [28] show
empirically that the probability of winning future loan business increases signif-
icantly and the probability of winning other fee generating business increases
marginally (in economic terms) if the bank has a lending relationship with the
borrower. Based on this evidence, [28] conclude that lending relationship is
beneficial to the bank. However, one cannot definitively say from these results
whether the bank benefits from the relationship without weighing the proba-
bilities of winning the future business with the revenues generated from these
mandates. In particular, loans are generally loss making products as shown in
this paper and the fact that a past relationship significantly increases the chance
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of winning a future loan mandate only shows that the expected value to the
bank from future loan business is signifianctly negative. Since the increase in
probability of winning non-loan business is marginal, the fee generated from
non-loan business must be very large to offset the expected negative value from
future loan business. Moreover, the causation is not clear: maybe the banks pro-
vide higher relationship benefit in anticipation of higher future revenues rather
than the higher relationship benefit causing higher future revenues. This paper
addresses the narrower question of whether there is a correlation between rela-
tionship benefit and expected future revenues; the issue of causation between
these variables cannot be addressed with our data.
We find that the relationship benefit increases with relationship breadth and
relationship potential but doesn’t depend on relationship depth. In other words,
the benefit of relationship banking is higher for relationships with broader scope
and larger future potential. Moreover, relationship potential is more important
than relationship breadth in determining the relationship benefit provided by
borrowers. The lack of significance of relationship depth in this paper contrasts
with some of the existing studies (e.g. [29]) which find a positive effect. The
paper finds some evidence which suggests that the significance of relationship
depth in some of these studies could be because these studies do not fully con-
trol for credit risk and do not include more comprehensive relationship vari-
ables such as relationship breadth and relationship potential. The significant
effect of relationship breadth on shortfall benefit suggests that the lack of such
an effect in some of the existing papers (e.g. [16] ) could be due to the use of
simple dummy variables to measure relationship breadth in these papers. The
novel result on the effect of relationship potential on relationship benefit sug-
gests that banks are forward looking in terms of passing on the relationship
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benefit to borrowers, though the causation cannot be clearly established.
We also find that relationship potential is the most important determinant of
relationship benefit for firms that are more informationaly opaque (firms with
high market-to-book ratio and small size) whereas relationship scope is more
important for less informationally opaque firms. Since small firms and growth
firms usually have low relationship breadth and high relationship potential, the
higher sensitivity of relationship benefit to relationship potential than to rela-
tionship breadth for these firms implies that relationship benefit is passed on to
the such borrowersmuch before the relationship breadth increases. On the other
hand, since large firms and value firms usually have high relationship breadth
and stagnant relationship potential, the higher sensitivity of relationship benefit
to relationship breadth than to relationship potential for these firms implies that
the relationship benefit tapers gradually if the borrower’s relationship potential
is declining.
This papermakes several contributions to the literature. First, it shows defin-
itively that borrowers benefit from a lending relationship through better terms
on their loan contracts since the fair value of loans is generally lower than the
par value of loans. Existing studies cannot say this for sure because their mea-
sures of relationship benefit are not precise. These studies regress relationship
variables on loan fees or collateral requirements or credit availability to deter-
mine whether stronger relationships result in better loan terms. However, as
argued earlier, lower loan rates or lower collateral requirements or better credit
availability by themselves or together do not imply a relationship benefit unless
all the risks are controlled for. This paper finds that relationship borrowers get
a dollar benefit on their loan contracts after controlling for all risks.
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Second, this paper uses comprehensive measures of relationship strength
and a precise measure of relationship benefit to uncover the true sources of re-
lationship benefit. The crude measures of relationship strength used in the liter-
ature have resulted in mixed empirical evidence on the sources of relationship
benefit. For instance, using relationship length as the measure of relationship
depth, some studies find that relationship depth results in lower loan rates and
lower collateral requirements (e.g. [1]) whereas some studies find no effect on
loan rates (e.g. [16]) and no effect on credit availability ([19]). Likewise, measur-
ing relationship breadth using dummy variables to denote the use of non-loan
financial services, some studies find that relationship breadth results in lower
loan rates (e.g. [11]) and some studies find no effect on loan rates (e.g. [16]).
This paper uses a precise dollar measure of relationship depth to show that rela-
tionship depth does not affect relationship benefit. On the other hand, a precise
dollar measure of relationship breadth is used to show that relationship breadth
positively affects relationship benefit. Finally, this paper is the first to show that
relationship benefit is driven by relationship potential, measured using a precise
dollar measure of the future revenue potential.
Third, it identifies several problems in the empirical specifications and the
corresponding results in the existing literature. The existing literature does not
fully control for the borrower’s credit risk in the regressions due to which one
cannot be sure if the borrower benefits from the lending relationship3. This pa-
per finds evidence that suggests that the positive effect of relationship depth on
relationship benefit in some of the existing studies may be because these studies
3Bharath et al (2008) use an instrument variable approach and a treatment effects model to
overcome the problem of unobserved credit quality. However, they acknowledge that their
instrument variable may be correlated with the error term contrary to the assumption of instru-
ment variable model. Their treatment effects model on the other hand allows for correlation
but assumes that the error term is bi-variate normal. They acknowledge that neither of these
assumptions can be empirically tested.
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do not fully control for credit risk and do not include more comprehensive re-
lationship varables such as relationship breadth and relationship potential. The
significant effect of relationship breadth on shortfall in this paper suggests that
the lack of such an effect in some of the existing papers could be due to their
crude measures for relationship breadth that do not capture the extent of use
of non-loan products and services. The existing literature uses the correlation
between relationship strength and the choice of borrower’s future mandates
to argue that banks benefit from the relationship through higher probability of
winning future business, an assertion which need not be true due to the loss-
making nature of loans and due to the difficulty in proving causation from such
correlation.
4.2 Loan Pricing
A loan with maximum committed limit L and maturity T comprises a drawn
portion ut 1L and an undrawn portion (1  ut 1)L. The borrower pays commit-
ment fee c on the undrawn amount and base rate b plus marginm on the drawn
amout. The bank funds the drawn portion of the loans at the base rate b plus
the funding cost f .
If the loan can be drawn on or defaulted on only at discrete times t 2
f0; 1; 2; :; :; Tg4. The time 0 value VL of the loan is given by the formula:
VL = E
264 TX
t=1
0B@ 1f>tg[(b+m)ut 1L  (b  f)ut 1L
+c(1  ut 1)L]  1f=tgL(1 RRt)
1CA exp   tX
j=1
rj
!375 (4.1)
4The extension of this expression to the general case wherein the firm can draw or default any
time during the maturity of the loan is straightforward but makes the notation more complex
without adding any new economic insights.
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where RRt is the loan recovery rate,  is the default time, and rt is the short
interest rate5. The above expression assumes that the loan is fully drawn in
the event of default. If we assume that rt is independent of  , expression (4.2)
simplifies to
VL =
TX
t=1
E
 
1f>tgL[(m  f)ut 1 + c(1  ut 1)]  L(1 RRt)1f=tg

dt (4.2)
where dt is the risk-free discount rate for maturity t. If we assume that the
utilization ut is independent of default probability with U = E(ut 1) and the
loan recovery rateRR is independent of interest rate and default timewithRL =
E(RRt)
6, expression (4.2) simplifies to
VL =
TX
t=1
[qt[(m  f)UL+ c(1  U)L]  L(1 RL)(qt 1   qt)] dt (4.3)
where qt = P ( > t) is the survival probability till time t and (qt 1  qt) = P ( =
t) is the default probability at time t.
The survival probabilities qt are bootstrapped from CDS spreads. Since the
value of CDS contract is zero at inititation, the expected value of premiums
paid on the CDS contract must equal the expected value of losses in the event
of default
E
"
nX
t=1
1f>tgCn
#
= E
"
nX
t=1
1f=tg(1 Rt) exp
 
 
tX
j=1
rj
!#
(4.4)
5The loan usually has many embedded options such as cancellation option, variable usage
option, extension option, multiple currency borrowing option, term-out option etc. Due to these
options, the cashflows from the loan are different from those mentioned in expression 1. How-
ever, these embedded options mainly introduce non-linearity in the loan price as a function
of credit spreads. Since this study uses linear regressions, we abstract away from these non-
linearities.
6In general, utilization and recovery rate are not independent of credit spreads which in turn
are not independent of interest rate. However, the correlations between these variables has little
effect on pricing. Assuming independence between these variables simplifies the notation and
provides more economic insights.
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where Cn is the CDS spread at maturity n 2 f1; 2; :::::; T ) and Rt is the bond
recovery rate. If interest rates, recovery rate and default time are independent7,
expression (4.4) simplifies to
Cn
 
nX
i=1
qidi
!
= (1 RC)
nX
i=1
(qi 1   qi)di (4.5)
where RC = E(Rt) is the expected bond recovery rate. Noting that q0 = d0 = 1,
the above expression can be used to bootstrap qi; i 2 f1; 2::::Tg; from the T
equations corresponding to CDS spreads at T maturities.
These survival probabilities are used in the loan pricing equation to get the
net present value of loan. If the expected bond recovery rate RC and the ex-
pected loan recovery rate RL are equal8, the loan pricing equation (3) and CDS
pricing equation (5) can be combined to obtain
VL =
TX
t=1
L(lf   CT )qtdt (4.6)
where lf = (m  f)U + c(1  U) is the net loan fees (fees received on the loan net
of funding cost).
Expression (4.6) states that the value of the loan is equal to the discounted9
value of the difference between the revenues received on the loan and the cost
of hedging and funding the loan. In particular, Llf is the annual revenue on
the loan net of funding, LCT is the annual cost of hedging the loan and the
difference between these two numbers when discounted and summed over the
maturity of the loan gives the value of the loan.
7These assumptions aremarket standard in the credit derivativemarket to bootstrap survival
probabilities. Moreover, as mentioned in the previous footnote, the correlations between these
variables has little effect on pricing.
8In general, these two recovery rates are different but we make this assumption to simplify
the notation and obtain more economic insights.
9The discounting is done using the risky discount rate which is equal to the riskless discount
rate multiplied by the survival probability.
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The loan shortfall SL is the value of loan below par. It is given by
SL = max( VL; 0)
= max
 
TX
t=1
L(CT   lf )qtdt; 0
!
(4.7)
= max
 
TX
t=1
L((1 RL)(qt 1   qt)  lfqt)dt; 0
!
(4.8)
4.3 Data
The data comes from four sources. The first data source is the Loan Database
which contains all the investment grade loans issued by the bank between Jan-
uary 2004 and June 2008. This dataset contains all loan specific details such as
committed limit, currency, issuance date, maturity date, expected recovery rate,
funding cost, expected utilization, and loan fees such as margin, commitment
fee, and facility fee. It also contains the loan lifetime shortfall which is the dif-
ference between the par value and the fair value of the loan. A total of 1,971
investment grade loans were issued to North American firms during this pe-
riod. These loans include new loans, and extensions or refinancing of existing
loans. The types of loan include term loans, loan commitments, letters of credit
and guarantees.
The second data source is the Customer Relationship Management (CRM)
database. It contains the yearly revenues generated for the bank by each cus-
tomer and the yearly shortfall incurred by the bank for each client between 2003
and 200710. The number of customers ranges between 3048 in 2003 and 5234 in
10The revenue data in the CRM database is recorded for each customer group rather than
for each customer. A customer group is a group of companies that belong to a legal group
company. For the purpose of this paper, we use the terms client, customer, and customer group
interchangeably.
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2007. The revenues generated by each customer are divided by product types.
The total revenue earned in a year from all existing loans to a client is referred
to as loan revenues or relationship depth. It is our measure of the strength of the
lending relationship as it depends on the number and size of loans issued to a
client in the last several years11. The annual revenue generated by a client from
all other products and services is referred to as non-loan revenues or relationship
breadth. It is our measure of the scope of the relationship since it depends on the
number and size of all non-loan products and services purchased by the client.
The yearly shortfall is the annual amortized shortfall over the loan maturity. If
the riskfree rate is zero, the yearly shortfall on a loan is equal to lifetime shortfall
divided by the loan tenor.
Note that the CRM database contains the yearly shortfall paid across all out-
standing loans to a customer whereas the loan database contains the lifetime
shortfall paid on each loan. For example, assume that as per the loan data-
base a customer took a 3 year loan in 2003 with a lifetime shortfall of $9mn, a
1 year loan in 2003 with a shortfall of $1mn, a 2 year loan in 2004 with a life-
time shortfall of $4mn, a 1 year loan in 2005 with a shortfall of $1mn. Then, if
the risk-less rate is zero, the CRM database would show the shortfall for this
customer as $4mn in 2003, $5mn in 2004 and $6mn in 2006. In short, the CRM
database divides the lifetime shortfall into annual installments and aggregates
these installments across all outstanding loans to the customer.
The third data source is the minutes of the Loan Screening Committee (LSC)
meetings. Every loan must be approved by the LSC before it can be issued
to the borrower. During the LSC, the economics of issuing the loan are dis-
11Since a loan may have a tenor of several years (generally not more than 5 years), the loan
revenues in a given year may have been contributed by a loan issued several years ago.
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cussed including the shortfall on the loan, the past relationship with the bor-
rower, and expected future revenues from the borrower over the next twelve
months. Based on this information, LSC decides whether to extend the loan12.
We use the minutes of these LSC meetings to obtain the expected loan and non-
loan revenues from the borrower over the next one year. The sum of the ex-
pected loan and non-loan revenues from the borrower over the next one year is
referred to as expected revenues or relationship potential. It is our measure of the
future potential of the relationship since it depends on the number and size of
all products and services that are expected to be procured by the client. The LSC
minutes are in the form of PDF files stored on the server and are organized by
the dates of LSC meetings. Around 300 of these files were manually searched to
get the expected revenues for 374 deals over the 2003-2008 period.
The fourth data source is the Compustat database which contains the yearly
accounting data and fiscal year-end share price for all North American firms.
In addition, the founding date of the firm is obtained from Capital IQ whereas
default spread and prime rate are obtained from the Federal Reserve website.
4.4 Empirical Specifications
It is easy to see from the shortfall expressons (7) and (8) that, if all else is equal,
shortfall is increasing in committed limit L, decreasing in loan fees lf , increasing
in loan tenor T , decreasing in expected loan recovery rate RL, and increasing
in the CDS spread CT for maturity T . The following linear expression can be
empirically estimated to see if the shortfall is related to the above variables as
12The LSC decision to extend a loan is subject to approval by the Credit Risk Management
group which evaluates the loan based on its credit risk.
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suggested by expressons (7) and (8).
SL = + L+ T + RL + Cn + lf (4.9)
Of course, this specification just captures the mechanistic relationship be-
tween shortfall and these variables and doesn’t add to the economic under-
standing of how the shortfall was determined. Therefore, to gain economic in-
sights, we use relevant economic variables as proxies for the independent vari-
ables in expression (4.9)
Usually, a bank can control the amount of shortfall by varying either the loan
fees or the committed limit, depending on the type of loan. In a bilateral loan,
usually the bank can vary only the loan fees to control the shortfall because the
borrower generally desires a specific committed limit and tenor. In the case of a
syndicate loan, a participating bank generally cannot influence the loan fees or
tenor but can choose the loan amount it commits to whereas the lead bank can
influence the loan fees as well. Therefore, the relationship benefit provided by
a bank should be reflected in the committed limit and loan fees agreed with the
customer: a more valued customer should get higher committed limits and/or
lower loan fees. Hence we use relationship variables as proxies for committed
limit and loan fees.
Our main relationship variables are loan revenues (relationship depth) and
non-loan revenues (relationship breadth) in the year prior to the year a loan is
issued, and expected revenues (relationship potential) in the year after a loan is
issued. In contrast, the extant literature has mainly used relationship length to
measure the strength of a relationship. Since our relationship data is from 2003
onwards, we cannot measure the length of each relationship. Instead, we use
a new relationship indicator which indicates whether a new relationship was
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initiated when a loan was issued. We also include firm age as a control variable
since [16] find that firm age is a better predictor of loan rate than relationship
length. We use book leverage, interest coverage ratio, default spread and prime
rate13 as proxies for credit spread and tangible asset percentage as a proxy for
loan recovery rate. We also include log sales, log market value, market-to-book
ratio and EBITDA by assets in the regressions since these variables could be
proxies for either relationship strength or credit spreads. In short, we estimate
the following modification of expression (4.9)
SL
T
= +
lX
i=1
ipi(RL) +
mX
j=1
jpj(Cn) +
nX
k=1
kpk(lf ; L) (4.10)
where SL
T
is the annual shortfall, pi(RL) are proxies for loan recovery rate RL,
pj(Cn) are proxies for credit spread Cn, and pk(lf ; L) are proxies for loan fees
lf and committed limit L. Annual shortfall SLT is used in the above regression
rather than lifetime shortfall SL because our relationship variables are yearly rev-
enues. However, for robustness, we also estimate the following specification
using lifetime shortfall
SL = + T +
lX
i=1
ipi(RL) +
mX
j=1
jpj(Cn) +
nX
k=1
kpk(lf ; L) (4.11)
to ensure that the use of annual shortfall is not driving the results. To account
for the possibility that committed limit is independent of relationship variables,
we also estimate the following specification
SL = + L+ T +
lX
i=1
ipi(RL) +
mX
j=1
jpj(Cn) +
nX
k=1
kpk(lf ) (4.12)
which assumes that relationship varibles effect loan fee only.
13Default spread is the difference between the average yield on BAA rated corporate bonds
and the average yield on 10 year government bonds. Prime rate is the average prime rate for
USD lending offered by banks in US to their best customers. Both the default spread and prime
rate are published daily by Federal Reserve.
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As mentioned in the previous section, the CRM database also has shortfall
data but in the form of yearly shortfall paid across all outstanding loans to a
customer. So as an alternative test, we use the shortfall data in CRM database
to estimate the following specification
SC = +
lX
i=1
ipi(RLC) +
mX
j=1
jpj(CnC) +
nX
k=1
kpk(lfC ; LC) (4.13)
where SC is the CRM yearly shortfall across all outstanding loans to a customer,
pj(CnC) are proxies for default probability of the customer, pi(RLC) are proxies
for loan recovery for the customer, and pk(lfC ; LC) are relationship variables that
proxy for loan amounts and fees agreed with the customer.
The advantage of specification (13) over (10) is that the former specification
uses the aggregate shortfall SC paid across all loans to a customer which is more
directly related to the annual revenue data than the annual shortfall SL
T
for each
individual loan. For example, suppose a customer generated a total revenue of
$10mn last year and requests two loans during the year with annual shortfall of
$1mn and $2mn respectivey. In such a case, specification (10) would attribute
both the shortfalls separately to the $10mn revenue resulting in double count-
ing of revenue whereas specification (13) would more reasonably attribute the
combined shortfall of $3mn to the $10mn revenue14.
However, SC in specification (13) aggregates not only the annual shortfall
from loans issued within a given year but also the annual shortfall from all out-
standing loans issued in prior years. For example, if a 5 year loan is issued to
a customer, the annual shortfall from that loan would be included in SC for the
next 5 years alongwith annual shortfalls from all other loanswhose life overlaps
14Another advantage of specification (13) is that both the shortfall and revenue data in the
CRM database pertain to a customer group. In contrast, specifications (10)-(12) have shortfall at
the customer level and revenues at the customer group level.
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with those years. Therefore, specification (13) attributes combined yearly short-
fall from all outstanding loans to the past year and expected next year yearly
revenues, which may seem problematic. However, since a customer can have
multiple loans across different years with different tenors, the combined annual
shortfall from all outstanding loans is one potential measure of the annual rela-
tionship benefit provided by the bank for a given level of annual revenues.
Since all the above specifications have their own strengths and shortcom-
ings, we estimate all the specifications to ensure that the main results of the
paper are not driven by the shortcomings of one specification.
4.5 Summary Statistics
As mentioned in the previous section, we test two alternative specifications us-
ing shortfall from two different databases. For the first specification, each North
American loan in the loan database is linked to the firm’s accounting data from
Compustat corresponding to the last fiscal year prior to loan issuance. The re-
sulting sample of 433 loans is linked to the expected revenue data to obtain a
sample of 164 loans which is hereafter referred to as Loan Database Sample. The
summary statistics of this sample are included in Table 4.1. The median com-
mitted limit is around EUR 52mn and the median loan tenor is five years. The
average expected utilization is quite low at 16% since most facilities are liquid-
ity lines or commercial paper back-up lines with 0% expected utilization. The
expected loan recovery rate varies very little around 40% with a low standard
deviation of 5%. The CDS spread is higher than the net loan fees by 33bps on
average, which results in an average shortfall of around EUR 0.8mn. The me-
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dian default spread for BAA bonds is 173 bps which is much larger than the
median CDS spread of 30bps for the loans in the sample. The average prior
year loan revenues is about EUR 0.4mn which is much smaller than the average
prior year non-loan revenues of EUR 2.8mn. The median expected revenues of
EUR 1.7mn is about twice the median prior year loan plus non-loan revenues.
The borrowers in the sample are large investment grade firms with an average
age of 75 years, median market value of EUR 18bn and average sales of EUR
36bn. About 2.4% of the borrowers have a new relationship with the bank.
Table 4.1 shows that the net loan fee is much lower than the CDS spread both
in terms of the mean andmedian. This result might suggest that borrowers ben-
efit from the relationship through better terms on the loan contract. However,
one cannot arrive at this conclusion if the loan recovery rate is much higher than
the bond recovery rate. Moreover, the loan has embedded options which need
to be accounted for to reach this conclusion. However, since the fair value of a
loan takes into account recovery rates and embedded options, a positive short-
fall reflects a relationship benefit to borrowers. Besides positive mean and me-
dian lifetime shortfall in our sample, more than 95% of the loans in our sample
have a positive lifetime shortfall suggesting that most borrowers benefit from
the relationship in the form of a better than fair loan rate that doesn’t compen-
sate for all the risks associated with the loan.
To obtain data for the second specification, we first filter out all the cus-
tomers with zero shortfall in all the years 2003-2007 in the CRM database. This
filtering is done because majority of the customers have no loans and hence no
shortfalls. For the remaining customers, the current yearly shortfall and past
year revenues in the CRM database are linked to the past fiscal accounting data
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Table 4.1
Summary Statistics for the Loan Database Sample
Panel A: Loan charactersitics
Variable Mean StdDev Median
lifetime_shortfall (EUR) 806,943 1,443,453 346,664
facility_limit (EUR) 89,346,852 144,315,427 52,501,991
expected_utilisation (%) 16 28 0
loan_recovery_rate (%) 41 5 40
margin (bps) 44 29 38
commitment_fee (bps) 9 6 8
funding_cost (bps) 9 9 8
net_loan_fees (bps) 16 17 10
loan_tenor (years) 4 2 5
Panel B: Relationship variables
Variable Mean StdDev Median
loan_revenues (EUR) 382,395 602,079 181,943
non_loan_revenue (EUR) 2,817,792 7,287,856 856,630
expected_revenues (EUR) 4,328,448 8,899,153 1,748,500
new_relationship_indicator 2.4% 15.5% 0.0%
Panel C: Company characteristics
Variable Mean StdDev Median
market_value (mn EUR) 45,341 69,816 18,343
sales (mn EUR) 36,782 64,327 12,586
tangible_assets_pct 65% 19% 67%
debt_by_assets 35% 21% 29%
interest_coverage_ratio 11 15 6
ebitda_by_assets 13% 5% 11%
MKT_TO_BOOK 3.43 7.14 2.49
firm_age (years) 75 45 77
Panel D: Market variables
Variable Mean StdDev Median
prime_rate (bps) 698 139 750
default_spread for BAA (bps) 190 46 173
cds_spread (bps) 49 51 30
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from Compustat. The resulting sample of 679 records are combined with the ex-
pected revenue data as follows. Since the expected revenue data is loan specific
whereas the CRM database is customer-specific, to link these two databases, the
expected revenue is averaged if any company has taken multiple loans in a given
year. The averaged expected revenue data is linked to the CRM data such that
the year of the loan issuance in the former database matches the year of shortfall
in the latter database. This results in a sample of 162 records, which is hereafter
referred to as CRM Database Sample. The summary statistics of this sample are
included in Table 4.2. The customer characteristics in the CRM Database Sample
such as accounting variables, market value and firm age are not much differ-
ent from those in the Loan Database Sample in terms of the median values but
the average market value and sales are much lower in the former sample than
in the latter sample. The median prior year loan revenues in the CRM Database
Sample is slightly less than that in the Loan Database Sample. The opposite holds
for median prior year non-loan revenue. The median yearly shortfall of 0.14mn
EUR is about one third of the median lifetime shortfall in the Loan Database Sam-
ple. The median expected revenue of EUR 2mn is about twice the median prior
year loan plus non-loan revenue, although in terms of average the difference
between these variables is much less.
4.6 Empirical Results
Table 4.3 contains the results when specification (9) is estimated. All the regres-
sion coefficients are statistically significant at 99% confidence and the signs on
the coefficients are same as those suggested by the shortfall equation. In par-
ticular, CDS spread, loan tenor and facility limit increase the shortfall whereas
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Table 4.2
Summary Statistics for the CRM Database Sample
Panel A: Shortfall and relationship variables
Variable Mean StdDev Median
shortfall (EUR) 412,552 1,106,355 141,080
loan_revenues (EUR) 328,386 573,242 171,212
non_loan_revenue (EUR) 3,141,822 8,132,369 943,099
expected_revenues (EUR) 3,689,955 5,947,444 2,080,000
new_firm 2.5% 15.6% 0.0%
Panel B: Company characteristics
Variable Mean StdDev Median
sales (mn) 25,932 43,617 11,711
market_value (mn) 34,927 51,219 17,045
tangible_assets_pct 63% 21% 67%
debt_by_assets 31% 20% 26%
interest_coverage_ratio 13 17 8
MKT_TO_BOOK 3.3 2.5 2.6
ebitda_by_assets 13% 6% 12%
firm_age (years) 72 47 69
recovery rate and loan fees reduce the shortfall.
For specification (10), several models are estimated in Table 4.4. As a start-
ing point, model 1 includes all the non-relationship variables, which explain
34% of the variation in shortfall. The generic default spread and prime rate are
positively significant as is expected from these measures of credit spread. The
tangible asset percentage is negatively significant as is expected from this mea-
sure of loan recovery rate. None of the other variables are significant. Model
2 extends model 1 by including firm age and new relationship indicator. None
of these commonly used measures of relationship are significant and the ex-
planatory power reduces slightly. Model 3 includes relationship depth (prior
year loan revenues) along with the other variables in Model 2. The explanatory
power is unchanged and the relationship depth is an insignificant predictor of
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Table 4.3
Effect of Loan Charactersitics on Shortfall in Loan Database Sample
This table provides the OLS estimates for equation (9). The dependent
variable is lifetime loan shortfall. Standard errors are in paranthesis
(*** Significant at one percent level, ** Significant at five percent level,
* Significant at 10 percent level)
Intercept 2351004**
(1134765)
facility_limit 0.006***
(0.0006)
net_loan_fees -49705***
(9132)
loan_tenor 1590***
(232)
loan_recovery_rate -137155***
(26683)
cds_spread 39908***
(3171)
Adj. R-square 0.4628
shortfall. Model 4 extends the previous model by adding relationship breadth
(prior year non-loan revenues) which is positively significant and the explana-
tory power increases significantly to 40%15. Model 5 further adds relationship
potential (expected next year revenues) which increases the explanatory power
by another 7%. Both relationship breadth and relationship potential have pos-
itive coefficients which are significant at 99% confidence level and relationship
depth remains insignificant. Finally, model 6 extends the previous model by
15Since Model 4 doesn’t have expected revenues as an independent variable, we can estimate
this model on the larger sample of 433 loans which when linked with the expected revenue data
resulted in the loan database sample of 164 loans. The main results from the smaller sample
hold in the larger sample.
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adding CDS spread, which is positively significant and the explanatory power
increases to 51%. Nonetheless, relationship breadth and potential remain posi-
tively significant at 99% confidence.
The insignificant effect of relationship depth on shortfall in this paper con-
trasts with the results in [29] who find that that their measure of relationship
depth significantly explains the loan rate offered to borrowers. These contrast-
ing results could be due to the fact that they do not fully control for credit spread
and because they do not include measures for relationship breadth and rela-
tionship potential. In particular, their independent variable is not risk-adjusted
and their control for default risk using default spread is imperfect. In contrast,
the independent variable here is risk adjusted since shortfall takes into account
default risk. Note also that a comparison of models 3-6 shows that the coef-
ficient on relationship depth reduces successively from small positive value to
large negative value as the other two relationship variables and CDS spread are
added one by one.
The significant effect of relationship breadth on shortfall in this paper clari-
fies the mixed results in the literature on whether the scope of a relationship is
a source of relationship benefit. Measuring relationship breadth using dummy
variables to denote the use of non-loan financial services, some existing studies
find that relationship breadth results in lower loan rates (e.g. [11]) and some
studies find no effect on loan rates (e.g. [16]). Since this paper uses a dollar
measure of relationship breadth which captures both the use and the extent of
use of other financial services, the results in this paper suggest that the lack of
significant effect of relationship breadth in some of the existing papers could be
due to the crude dummy variables used to measure relationship breadth.
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Table 4.4
Effect of Relationship Variables on Shortfall in Loan Database Sample
This table provides OLS estimates for equation (10) for the loan database
sample. The dependent variable is annual loan shortfall. Standard errors are
included in paranthesis (*** Significant at one percent level, ** Significant at
five percent level, * Significant at 10 percent level).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intercept -1292189*** -1308697*** -1344752*** -1118051** -950473** -1864702***
(456727) (462068) (468677) (445792) (424783) (688302)
interest_coverage_ratio -24 -287 -425 846 1424 878
(2559) (2625) (2648) (2518) (2389) (2541)
debt_by_assets 68777 39443 -7346 37791 287868 593015
(337811) (351916) (363827) (342748) (332663) (395736)
prime_rate 671** 685** 729** 732** 539* 712
(298) (301) (313) (295) (285) (604)
default_spread 5154*** 5077*** 5150*** 4952*** 4852*** 3987***
(791) (805) (820) (774) (733) (1212)
cds_spread 4427***
(1511)
tangible_assets_pct -517044*** -530351*** -537413*** -378344** -399516** -330912*
(176300) (178096) (179269) (174580) (165340) (187547)
relationship_depth 0.04 0.02 -0.06 -0.2
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.2)
relationship_breadth 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.02***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
relationship_potential 0.04*** 0.04***
(0.01) (0.01)
new_relationship 155794 156922 121048 190075 98256
(290784) (291921) (275005) (261059) (272051)
firm_age 585 535 104 -108 151
(724) (733) (700) (666) (755)
log_sales 26853 18851 15541 12994 22261 15800
(42775) (44362) (44957) (42329) (40154) (46254)
log_market_value 1479 9603 12014 -13814 -37767 37055
(51097) (52140) (52534) (49986) (47832) (60759)
MKT_TO_BOOK 3572 2347 2303 1906 -1447 383
(3574) (4905) (4925) (4638) (4499) (4768)
ebitda_by_assets 457599 444520 511862 117546 265861 376382
(786021) (791181) (804053) (765010) (725323) (816736)
Adj. R-square 0.34 0.33 0.33 0.40 0.47 0.51
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The result that relationship potential affects shortfall is novel since none of
the existing studies have used relationship potential to study relationship bene-
fit. It suggests the possibility that the bank is forward looking in terms of pass-
ing on the relationship benefit to borrowers. However, this correlation doesn’t
necessarily imply a causation from expected revenue to shortfall. The issue of
causation cannot be addressedwith this data. The coefficient on relationship po-
tential is about twice the coefficent on relationship breadth, suggesting that the
bank puts more emphasis on relationship potential than relationship breadth
while deciding the shortfall.
Tangible assets percentage is negatively significant in all the models which
suggests that it is a good proxy for loan recovery rate. The generic default
spread and prime rate are positively significant in almost all the models which
suggests that these variables proxy well for credit spread. However, the fact
that CDS spread is significant in the last model suggest that these variables do
not fully control for credit spread. The fact that default spread and prime rate
are significant in the last model despite including CDS spread may be due to
the non-linear dependence of shortfall on CDS spread.
The results for specifications (11) and (12) are included in Table 4.5. Both
these specifications have lifetime shortfall as the dependent variable and control
for loan tenor as an independent variable but differ in the assumption whether
facility limit is affected by relationship variables or not. In specification (11)
where facility limit is assumed to be affected by relationship factors, loan tenor
is positively significant but the relationship variables have the same effect as
in specification (10) estimated in Table 4.4. Specification (12) includes facility
limit as an additional independent variable which turns out to be positively sig-
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Table 4.5
Other Specifications on the Effect of Relationship Variables on Shortfall
This table provides the OLS estimates for equation (11) and (12) for the loan
database sample.The dependent variable is lifetime loan shortfall. Standard
errors are in paranthesis.(*** Significant at one percent level, ** Significant
at five percent level, * Significant at 10 percent level).
Spec 11 Spec 12
Intercept -3376930* -2418904
(1955400) (1909561)
facility_limit 0.003***
(0.001)
loan_tenor 635*** 855***
(234) (238)
debt_by_assets -2777 -18807
(10431) (11486)
interest_coverage_ratio 468053 -471030
(1449455) (1431652)
prime_rate 1850 1373
(1261) (1224)
default_spread 14837*** 13240***
(3192) (3120)
tangible_assets_pct -1199325* -794278
(720409) (706935)
relationship_depth -0.3 -0.3
(0.3) (0.3)
relationship_breadth 0.11*** 0.09***
(0.04) (0.03)
relationship_potential 0.16*** 0.1**
(0.05) (0.05)
new_relationship 594635 452269
(1137474) (1094754)
firm_age -872 -1928
(2903) (2815)
log_sales 55950 36626
(175010) (168398)
log_market_value -122761 -166627
(213790) (206119)
MKT_TO_BOOK -3203 -566
(19611) (18877)
ebitda_by_assets -273218 -311932
(3164852) (3042877)
Adj. R-square 0.37 0.42
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nificant but the relationship variables have the same significant effect as in the
previous model. Prime rate and tangible asset percentage become insignificant
but generic default spread remains significant in both these specifications16.
Table 4.6 includes the estimation results for various models with specifica-
tion (13). Since this specification uses the yearly aggregate shortfall (from CRM
Database Sample) comprising shortfall from all existing loans issued at various
points in time, we cannot use generic default spread or prime rate to capture
the default risk. The remaining variables used in this specification are the same
as those used in specification (10). Model 1 includes only accounting variables,
model 2 adds firm age and new relationship indicator, and models 3-5 succes-
sively adds the three relationship variables. The results with these models are
similar to those with specification (10) in Table 4.417. Firm age, new relation-
ship indicator and relationshp depth have an insignificant effect on shortfall.
Relationship breadth and relationship potential are positively significant and
together these variables triple the explanatory power. This specification too
suggests that the bank places more emphasis on relationship potential than re-
lationship breadth.
To summarize, across all the specifications and models, the shortfall in-
creases with relationship breadth and potential, suggesting that the benefit of
relationship banking is larger for relationships with broader scope and better
future potential. Also, it seems that relationship potential is more important
than relationship breadth in determining the relationship benefit obtained by
16Several other models were estimated with specifications (11) and (12) but the main results
are same as those presented in Table 5.
17Since Model 4 doesn’t have expected revenue as an independent variable, we can estimate
this model on the larger sample of 679 records which when linked with the expected revenue
data resulted in the CRM database sample of 162 records. The main results from the smaller
sample hold in this larger sample.
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Table 4.6
Effect of Relationship Variables on Shortfall in CRM Database Sample
This table provides the OLS estimates for equation (13) for the CRM
Database Sample. The dependent variable is annual customer shortfall.
Standard errors are in paranthesis.(*** Significant at one percent level,
** Significant at five percent level, * Significant at 10 percent level)
.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Intercept -491757 -529089* -527272* -464534 -307222
(305713) (308156) (310476) (301330) (281309)
interest_coverage_ratio 599 509 505 609 -138
(2088) (2092) (2103) (2036) (1892)
debt_by_assets 523306* 529772* 524354* 429995 491743*
(270763) (271373) (280623) (273699) (253665)
tangible_assets_pct -146397 -126494 -124982 -47073 -162610
(142920) (144098) (145984) (144029) (136071)
relationship_depth 0.006 0.02 -0.03
(0.08) (0.07) (0.07)
relationship_breadth 0.02*** 0.01**
(0.006) (0.006)
relationship_potential 0.05***
(12114)
new_firm -43815 -44200 -44053 -73122
(196433) (197461) (191108) (176958)
firm_age -802 -803 -1021* -770
(623) (627) (612) (569)
log_sales 5873 12769 12140 16186 14080
(38538) (38974) (39911) (38654) (35768)
log_mkt_value 74669* 75733* 75990* 61542 34858
(44130) (44310) (44640) (43514) (40760)
MKT_TO_BOOK -10952 -8138 -8036 -3464 -5427
(11873) (12111) (12234) (11954) (11070)
ebitda_by_assets -809519 -820520 -818203 -965271 -410352
(631620) (633561) (637327) (619078) (587838)
Adj. R-square 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.14 0.26
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borrowers. Unlike the past literature, relationship depth, new relationship and
firm age do not explain the relationship benefit provided to borrowers. The
significance of these variables in previous studies could be because these stud-
ies do not fully control for credit risk and do not include more comprehensive
relationship varables such as relationship breadth and relationship potential.
4.7 Additional Tests
While expected future revenue (relationship potential) is a significant predictor
of relationship benefit, this relation is economically meaningful only if expected
future revenue is a significant predictor of actual future revenues. Testing this
hypothesis is complicated by the fact that the revenue data in CRM Database
Sample is measured as of year-end whereas expected revenue data is measured
as of the loan issuance date, which could be anytime during the year. To over-
come this problem, we estimate whether next year total revenue (loan plus non-
loan revenue) can be explained by current year total revenue, past year total
revenue and expected revenue as of loan issuance date in the current year. For
example if the expected revenue data is as of May 2006, we investigate whether
the total revenue in 2007 can be explained by the total revenues in 2005 and 2006
and the expected revenues as of May 2006. The estimation results are reported
in Table 4.7. All the three independent variables are positively significant with
an explanatory power of 55%. Expected revenues has the highest sensitivity
followed by current total revenues and past total revenues. Therefore, expected
revenue is an economically meaningful variable that can predict future revenue
beyond what can be predicted with historical revenue data. This test also jus-
tifies the use of expected revenue as a measure of relationship potential. Note
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Table 4.7
Relationship Between Expected Revenues and Future Revenues
This table provides the OLS estimates of a regression wherein the
dependent variable is next period revenue and the independent
variables.are previous period, current period and expected revenues.
Standard errors are in paranthesis.(*** Significant at one percent level,
** Significant at five percent level, * Significant at 10 percent level)
.
Intercept -483208
(413053)
expected_revenues 0.42***
(0.09)
current_revenues 0.41***
(0.13)
past_revenues 0.23**
(0.11)
Adj. R-square 0.53
that this result shows a correlation not causation between expected future rev-
enues and future revenues. Therefore, this result combined with the results in
the previous section imply a correlation not causation between shortfall and fu-
ture revenues. The issue of causation cannot be addressed with this data set.
Panel A of Table 4.8 studies the time variation of parameter estimates by
splitting the Loan Database Sample by date. The first half sample broadly corre-
sponds to the period 2004-2005 and the second half sample broadly corresponds
to the period 2006-2007. The explanatory power is higher in the second half
sample but both relationship breadth and relationship potential are significant
in both half samples. As compared to the first half sample, the sensitivity of
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shortfall to relationship breadth has increased and its sensitivity to relationship
potential has decreased in the second half sample. However, in absolute terms,
relationship potential is more important than relationship breadth in both half
samples. These results suggest that the criteria for providing relationship bene-
fit has changed in the second half sample. The time variation in these parameter
estimates could potentially be explained by the fact that LSC meetings were ini-
tiated in 2003. It is likely that this time variation is the result of the learning
process by which the bank became accustomed to the new LSC process.
4.8 Effect of Informational Opacity
In this section, we investigate how our results are affected by differences in in-
formational opacity across borrowers. Since the main premise of relationship
banking is that it resolves information asymmetry between the bank and the
borrower, the effect of relationship banking should be different depending on
whether the borrower is more or less informationally opaque. The commonly
used measures of informational opacity are market-to-book ratio, asset size, in-
clusion in S&P500, existence of credit ratings, and trading in CDSmarkets ([29]).
We use the first two measures of informationally opacity for our analysis be-
cause the remaining three measures result in a very small sample 18.
Panel B of Table 4.8 studies the effect of the splitting the sample into two sub-
sets based on the market-to-book ratio. Both the samples have about the same
explanatory power and relationship depth is insignificant in both the samples.
The growth firms have high positively significant sensitivity to relationship po-
18Only four of the 164 loans in our sample correspond to borrowers who have no credit rating,
or no traded CDS, or are not included in S&P 500.
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tential and insignificant sensitivity to relationship breadth. On the other hand,
value firms have insignificant sensitivity to relationship potential and high pos-
itively significant sensitivity to relationship breadth. Since growth firms usually
have low past non-loan revenues and high expected revenues, the higher sen-
sitivity of shortfall to relationship potential than relationship breadth for these
firms implies that the relationship benefit is passed on to the borrower much be-
fore the non-loan revenues increase. On the other hand, since value firms usu-
ally have high non-loan revenues and stagnant expected revenues, the higher
sensitivity of shortfall to non-loan revenues than expected revenues for these
firms implies that the relationship benefit tapers gradually if the borrower’s ex-
pected revenues are declining.
Finally, Panel C of Table 4.8 studies the effect of splitting the sample in two
based on the book value of assets. The sample with large firms has signifi-
cantly higher explanatory power than the sample with small firms. Here too,
the two samples have different sensitivities to relationship breadth and poten-
tial whereas relationship depth is insignificant in both the samples. Large firms
have insignificant sensitivity to relationship potential and positively significant
sensitivity to relationship breadth. Small firms have the exact opposite effect.
As in the case of growth and value firms, these results imply that small firms
get a sizeable relationship benefit despite low past non-loan revenues (in an-
ticipation of future business) and large firms get a sizeable relationship benefit
despite declining expected revenues (as reward for current business).
Together, the results in Table 4.8 suggest that relationship potential is the
most important determinant of relationship benefit for firms that are more in-
formationaly opaque (firms with high market-to-book and small size) whereas
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Table 4.8
Effect of Splitting Loan Database Sample by Date, M/B and Asset Size
This table provides the OLS estimates for equation (10) when the Loan
Database Sample is split by date, market-to-book and asset size. The
dependent variable is annual loan shortfall. The sample is split in to two
exact halves by date or M/B or asset size.Standard errors are included
in paranthesis.(*** Significant at one percent level, ** Significant at five
percent level, * Significant at 10 percent level)
First Half Second Half Low M/B High M/B Small Firms Large Firms
Adj. R-square 0.34 0.63 0.75 0.74 0.30 0.64
Intercept -212478 -5539497*** 646331 -2003555*** -70980 -2106973**
(1155818) (1606278) (662952) (387133) (740527) (1033168)
interest_coverage_ratio -2451 3932 -36434* -57 -5656 6855*
(4062) (3314) (17864) (1834) (4822) (3769)
debt_by_assets -623828 934851* -917611 123904 -169894 1752984**
(503427) (494805) (692752) (293508) (256874) (785043)
prime_rate 506 4529*** 1162*** 753*** 272 419
(547) (1420) (365) (252) (239) (600)
default_spread 2638 12106*** 4850*** 8809*** 2970 5646***
(4226) (2374) (808) (812) (2168) (1118)
tangible_assets_pct -201873 -79808 -777098*** -117312 -176250 -1284137***
(247493) (240554) (209134) (188837) (116896) (330784)
relationship_depth -0.03 -0.5 0.2 0.004 -0.06 -0.4
(0.09) (0.3) (0.2) (0.06) (0.05) (0.3)
relationship_breadth 0.02** 0.03* 0.1*** -0.004 -0.0004 0.05***
(0.009) (0.02) (0.02) (0.006) (0.005) (0.01)
relationship_potential 0.07*** 0.05*** 0.01 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.01
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.009) (0.02)
firm_age 70306 -5695940* 0 198330 80798 0
(254105) (2992629) (0) (172020) (124915) (0)
new_firm -666 948 1054 -227 101 746
(935) (937) (834) (755) (455) (1376)
log_sales -39355 58590 33649 1766 -26790 67769
(66625) (55867) (52239) (40949) (24632) (107481)
log_mkt_value 26754 -111517 -205328*** -7273 -20398 65479
(66394) (71913) (72742) (42640) (30575) (169727)
MKT_TO_BOOK -2631 67644* -48582 -1497 537 -59395
(17548) (34880) (118675) (3236) (2282) (61414)
ebitda_by_assets -801567 -985600 2783310** 277858 546439 -732535
(1175667) (1129212) (1257588) (936815) (543681) (1422269)
Panel A Panel B Panel C
Sample Split by Date Sample Split by M/B Sample Split by Asset Size
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relationship breadth is more important for less informationally opaque firms.
Table 4.9 includes the same tests as in Table 4.8 but with the CRM Database
Sample rather than the Loan Database Sample. Panels A, B and C of Table 4.9
study the effect of splitting the CRM Database Sample by date, market-to-book
ratio and asset size respectively. The main results and conclusions are same
as in Table 4.8. So the results from sample splitting are robust to alternative
specifiations.
4.9 Conclusion
While numerous theoretical studies have identified the sources of relationship
banking benefits, empirical studies have been constrained in testing these the-
ories by the availability of data. The crude measures for relationship strength
and benefit used in the existing literature has yielded mixed empirical support
to the claims made in the theoretical literature and has not fully identified the
sources of relationship benefit. This paper uses a proprietary dataset from a
multinational bank to precisely measure relationship strength and uncover the
true sources of relationship banking benefits to borrowers. Relationship bene-
fit is measured as the difference between the par value and the fair value of a
loan where the fair value is calculated using the market implied default prob-
abilities, collateral-dependent recovery rates, and loan features including any
embedded options. Relationship strength is measured along three dimensions:
relationship depth, relationship breadth, and relationship potential. Relation-
ship depth is measured as the annual revenue generated from all existing loans
issued to the borrower by the bank. Relationship breadth is measured as the an-
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Table 4.9
Effect of Splitting CRM Database Sample by Date, M/B and Asset Size
This table provides the OLS estimates for equation (10) when the CRM
Database Sample is split by date, market-to-book and asset size. The
dependent variable is annual customer shortfall. The sample is split in
to two halves by date or M/B or asset size.Standard errors are included
in paranthesis.(*** Significant at one percent level, ** Significant at five
percent level, * Significant at 10 percent level)
First Half Second Half Low M/B High M/B Small Firms Large Firms
Adj. R-square 0.27 0.31 0.24 0.38 0.13 0.46
Intercept -48812 -113209 600382 -200804 -339781 -624559
(427978) (436208) (701874) (308025) (501344) (624692)
interest_coverage_ratio -136 -2614 -11504 742 1108 -1151
(2108) (3869) (12055) (1932) (2122) (3779)
debt_by_assets 271841 365253 -468084 609138** 300286 875174*
(332048) (381172) (780095) (286464) (288460) (480911)
tangible_assets_pct -222506 -222063 -392509* 123438 81630 -512267**
(201254) (190679) (223067) (179342) (171655) (219131)
relationship_depth -0.01 -0.1 0.09 -0.1 -0.08 0.05
(0.06) (0.3) (0.1) (0.09) (0.09) (0.1)
relationship_breadth -0.0002 0.04*** 0.04** 0.01* 0.008 0.06***
(0.006) (0.01) (0.02) (0.006) (0.006) (0.02)
relationship_potential 0.08*** 0.043** 0.02 0.1*** 0.06** 0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
firm_age 0 -80293 10903 -499709** -84394 0
(0) (202438) (274023) (246343) (165650) (0)
new_firm 260 -1175 -388 -471 -703 1027
(813) (890) (993) (784) (779) (1058)
log_sales -2298 32854 13043 60820 23499 13902
(45321) (62277) (62484) (44166) (40753) (68035)
log_mkt_value 25057 -2010 -11546 -48575 23870 55437
(48776) (74366) (81756) (52007) (56617) (90802)
MKT_TO_BOOK -2909 -18751 -112131 2229 2354 -13696
(13052) (20433) (135733) (11660) (11906) (34227)
ebitda_by_assets -574742 665764 1476576 -894446 -1029972 91182
(718109) (1074009) (1196150) (726371) (704182) (1018953)
Panel A Panel B Panel C
Sample Split by Date Sample Split by M/B Sample Split by Asset Size
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nual revenue generated from all non-loan products and services purchased by
the borrower from the bank. Relationship potential is measured as the revenue
expected to be generated in the next one year across all products and services
provided to the borrower by the bank.
This paper finds that the borrowers benefit from a lending relationship
through better terms on their loan contracts. The relationship benefit increases
with relationship breadth and relationship potential but does not depend on re-
lationship depth. Moreover, relationship potential is more important than rela-
tionship breadth in determining the relationship benefit provided by borrowers.
The paper also finds some evidence which suggests that the significance of re-
lationship depth in some of these studies could be because these studies do not
fully control for credit risk and do not include more comprehensive relationship
variables such as relationship breadth and relationship potential. The signifi-
cant effect of relationship breadth on shortfall benefit suggests that the lack of
such an effect in some of the existing papers could be due to their crude mea-
sures for relationship breadth that do not capture the extent of use of non-loan
products and services. The novel result about the effect of relationship poten-
tial on relationship benefit suggests that banks are forward looking in terms of
passing on the relationship benefit to borrowers, though the causation cannot
be clearly established. The paper also suggests that the assertion in the existing
literature that banks benefit from a relationship through higher probability of
winning future loan and fee business need not be true due to the loss-making
nature of loans and because the causation between relationship benefit and fu-
ture revenue cannot be clearly established.
We also find that relationship potential is the most important determinant of
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relationship benefit for firms that are very informationally opaque (firms with
high market-to-book ratio and small size) whereas relationship breadth is more
important for less informationally opaque firms. These results imply that rela-
tionship benefit is passed on to small firms and growth firms much before their
relationship breadth increases. These results also imply that relationship benefit
tapers gradually for large firms and value firms if their relationship potential is
declining.
109
REFERENCES
[1] Berger AN and Udell GF. Relationship lending and lines of credit in small
firm finance. Journal of Business, 68:351–381, 1995.
[2] Boot AWA. Relationship banking: What do we know? Journal of Financial
Intermediation, 9:7–25, 2000.
[3] Boot AWA, Greenbaum S, and Thakor AV. Reputation and discretion in
financial contracting. American Economic Review, 83:1165–1183, 1993.
[4] James C. Some evidence on the uniqueness of bank loans. Journal of Finan-
cial Economics, 19:217–35, 1987.
[5] Heath D, Jarrow RA, andMorton A. Bond pricing and the term structure of
interest rates: A new methodology for contingent claims valuation. Econo-
metrica, 60:77–105, 1992.
[6] Lando D. On cox processes and credit risky securities. Review of Derivatives
Research, 2:99–120, 1998.
[7] Diamond DW. Financial intermediation and delegated monitoring. Review
of Economic Studies, 62:393–414, 1984.
[8] Black F and Scholes M. The pricing of options and corporate liabilities.
Journal of Political Economy, pages 637–654, 1973.
[9] Fabozzi F and Konishi A. The Handbook of Asset/Liability Management:
State-of-Art Investment Strategies, Risk Controls and Regulatory Requirements.
McGraw-Hill Publishing, Columbus, 1995.
[10] Longstaff FA, Mithal S, and Neis E. Corporate yield spreads: Default risk
or liquidity? new evidence from the credit default swapmarket. The Journal
of Finance, 60:2213–2253, 2005.
[11] Degryse H and Cayseele PV. Relationship lending within a bank based
system: Evidence from european small business data. Journal of Financial
Intermediation, 9:90–109, 2000.
[12] Shirakawa H. Interest rate option pricing with poisson-gaussian forward
rate processes. Mathematical Finance, 1:77–94, 1991.
110
[13] Hull J and White A. Numerical procedures for implementing term struc-
ture models ii : Two factor models. Journal of Derivatives, 2:37–48, 1994.
[14] Berlin M and Mester LJ. Deposits and relationship lending. Review of Fi-
nancial Studies, 12:579–607, 1999.
[15] Berlin M and LJ Mester. Debt covenants and renegotiations. Journal of
Financial Intermediation, 2:95–133, 1992.
[16] Petersen MA and Rajan RG. The benefits of lending relationships: Evi-
dence from small business data. Journal of Finance, 49:3–37, 1994.
[17] Glasserman P. Monte Carlo Methods in Financial Engineering. Springer-
Verlag, New York, 2003.
[18] Schonbucher PJ. Credit derivatives pricing models. JohnWiley and Sons, West
Sussex England, 2003.
[19] Cole RA. The importance of relationships to the availability of credit. The
Journal of Banking and Finance, 22:959–977, 1998.
[20] Jarrow RA and Stuart Turnbull S. Pricing derivatives on financial securities
subject to credit risk. Journal of Finance, 50:53–85, 1995.
[21] Merton RC. On the pricing of corporate debt: The risk structure of interest
rates. Journal of Finance, 29:449–470, 1974.
[22] Rajan RG. Insiders and outsiders: The choice between informed and arms
length debt. Journal of Finance, 47:1367–1400, 1992.
[23] Ramakrishnan RTS and Thakor AV. Information reliability and a theory of
financial intermediation. Review of Economic Studies, 51:415–432, 1984.
[24] Drucker S and Puri M. On the benefits of concurrent lending and under-
writing. Journal of Finance, 60:2763–2799, 2005.
[25] Ongena S and Smith DC. Bank relationships: A review. In Zenios SA
Harker P, editor, The Performance of Financial Institutions, page 221U˝258.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000.
[26] Sharpe SA. Asymmetric information, bank lending and implicit contracts:
111
A stylized model of customer relationships. Journal of Finance, 45:1069–
1087, 1990.
[27] Lummer SI and McConnell JJ. Further evidence on the bank lending
process and the capital market response to bank loan agreements. Journal
of Financial Economics, 25:99–122, 1989.
[28] Bharath ST, Dahiya S, Saunders A, and Srinivasan A. So what do i get? the
bank’s view of lending relationships. Journal of Financial Economics, 85:368–
419, 2007.
[29] Bharath ST, Dahiya S, Saunders A, and Srinivasan A. Lending relationships
and loan contract terms. Review of Financial Studies, page Forthcoming,
2010.
[30] Duffy T, Hatzakis M, HsuW, Labe R, Liao B, Luo X, Oh J, Setya S, and Yang
L. Merrill lynch improves liquidity risk management for revolving credit
lines. Interfaces, 35:353–369, 2005.
112
